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Abstract
A Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium (SORTE) was introduced in ”Systemic Optimal
Risk Transfer Equilibrium” for the analysis of the equilibrium among financial institutions or
in insurance-reinsurance markets. A SORTE conjugates the classical Bu¨hlmann’s notion of an
equilibrium risk exchange with a capital allocation principle based on systemic expected utility
optimization. In this paper we extend such notion to the case in which the value function to
be optimized has two components, one being the sum of the single agents’ utility functions,
the other consisting of a truly systemic component. The latter could be either enforced by an
external regulator or be agreed on by the participants in the market. Technically, the extension
of SORTE to the new setup requires developing a theory for multivariate utility functions and
selecting at the same time a suitable framework for the duality theory. Conceptually, this
more general framework allows us to introduce and study a Nash Equilibrium property of
the optimizer. We prove existence, uniqueness, Pareto optimality and the Nash Equilibrium
property of the newly defined Multivariate Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium.
Keywords: Equilibrium, Systemic Utility Maximization, Risk Transfer Equilibrium, Systemic
Risk.
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010): 91G99; 91B30; 60A99; 91B50; 90B50.
JEL Classification: G1; C610; C650.
1 Introduction
A Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium, denoted with SORTE, was introduced and ana-
lyzed in [5]. The SORTE concept was inspired by Bu¨hlmann’s notion of a Risk Transfer Equilibrium
in insurance-reinsurance markets. However, in Bu¨hlmann’s definition the vector assigning the bud-
get constraints was given a priori. On the contrary, in the SORTE, such a vector is endogenously
determined by solving a systemic utility maximization problem. As remarked in [5], “SORTE
gives priority to the systemic aspects of the problem, in order to optimize the overall systemic per-
formance, rather than to individual rationality”. We refer to [5] for a more detailed motivation
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underlying the concept of a SORTE, as well as for the study of its existence, uniqueness and Pareto
optimality. In Section 1.1 we will only very briefly recall its definition in order to compare it with
the results of the present paper.
The capital allocation and risk sharing equilibrium that we consider in this new work, similarly to
the one introduced in [5], can be applied to many contexts, such as: equilibrium among financial
institutions, agents, or countries; insurance and reinsurance markets; capital allocation among
business units of a single firm; wealth allocation among investors.
1.1 Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium
In a one period setup, we considerN agents, each one characterized by a strictly concave, monotone
increasing utility function un : R→ R and by the original risk Xn ∈ L0(Ω,F ,P), for n = 1, ..., N .
The vector X = (X1, ..., XN) denotes then the original risk configuration of the system. Here,
(Ω,F ,P) is a probability space and L0(Ω,F ,P) is the vector space of (equivalence classes of) real
valued F -measurable random variables. The σ− algebra F represents all possible measurable
events at the final time T . EQ [·] denotes the expectation under a probability Q. For the sake of
simplicity, we are assuming zero interest rate.
We consider an economy in which each agent is allowed to exchange risk with the other agents.
Each agent j has to agree to receive (if positive) or to provide (if negative) the amount Y j(ω) at
the final time in exchange of the amount EQj
[
Y j
]
paid (if positive) or received (if negative) at
the initial time, where Q := (Q1, ...,QN) is some pricing probability vector. Hence Y j is a time T
measurable random variable.
We also assume that the system of N agents has at disposal a total amount of capital A ∈ R. Each
agent j can receive (or pay) the amount aj at initial time in such a way that
∑N
j=1 a
j = A. While
the quantity A is exogenously preassigned, the allocation (aj)j will be endogenously determined
by solving a maximization problem. In order that at the final time the risk sharing procedure is
indeed possible, the exchange variables Y j , j = 1, . . . , N have to satisfy the clearing condition
N∑
j=1
Y j = A P-a.s. (1)
We introduce further possible constraints on the optimal solution, by requiring that
Y ∈ B (2)
for a given set of feasible allocations B ⊆ L0(Ω,F ,P;RN ). We refer to [5] for a detailed discussion
regarding such set B, as well as for examples for it. We just stress here the fact that the (possi-
bly X−dependent) set B is meant to model agents’ attitude or constraints in the risk exchange
procedure at terminal time.
As explained in Definition 3.7 [5], a SORTE is a triple given by a random vector YX = (Y
1
X , ..., Y
N
X )
satisfying (1) and (2), a vector of probability measures QX = (Q
1
X , ...,Q
N
X) and a vector aX =
(a1X , ..., a
N
X) ∈ R
N such that (YX ,QX , aX) solves the following problem
sup
a∈RN

N∑
j=1
sup
Y j
{
E
[
uj(X
j + Y j)
]
| E
Q
j
X
[Y j ] ≤ aj
}
|
N∑
j=1
aj = A
 := SQX (A).
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Each agent is therefore optimizing his/her expected utility with the budget constraint assigned
by an equilibrium pricing vector QX of probability measures, which is part of the solution of the
problem. Note also that the vector a ∈ RN in the budget constraint E
Q
j
X
[Y j ] ≤ aj is determined
globally via the additional systemic maximization problem sup
a∈RN {... |
∑N
n=1 a
n = A}. In this
sense, a SORTE assigns priority to the systemic performance, rather than to each individual agent.
Note that the optimal systemic utility SQX (A) can also be rewritten as:
SQX (A) = sup
a∈RN
 supY=(Y 1,...,YN )

N∑
j=1
E
[
uj(X
j + Y j)
]
| E
Q
j
X
[Y j ] ≤ aj ∀j
 |
N∑
j=1
aj = A
 . (3)
As shown in the next subsection, we will use this reformulation to extend the SORTE concept to
a multivariate setting (compare with (5)).
1.2 Multivariate Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium
In this paper we will consider multivariate utility functions U : RN → R of the form
U(x) :=
N∑
j=1
uj(x
j) + Λ(x) (4)
where u1, . . . , uj : R→ R are the single agent utility functions and
Λ : RN → R
is a (not necessairly strictly) concave, increasing function on RN that is bounded from above.
Using the additional aggregative term Λ we can model the fact that the choices of each single
agent in the system depend not only on his/her individual preferences, but also on others agents’
behavior.
As explained in detail in Section 5.1, there are two (a priori non equivalent) ways of generalizing
the concept of SORTE to the multivariate setup. The first approach considers the most natural
counterpart of Definition 3.7 in [5] in the multivariate setup, which leads to the definition of Weak
Multivariate SORTE (Definition 5.1). The second one is motivated by the formulation (3) of the
SORTE, and yields the concept of Multivariate SORTE. As can be easily verified, a Multivariate
SORTE turns out to be in particular a Weak Multivariate SORTE and we will mostly focus our
attention on the stronger concept.
To be more precise, we will define (Section 5.1) a Multivariate Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer
Equilibrium (mSORTE) as a triple (YX ,QX , aX) such that YX = (Y
1
X , ..., Y
N
X ) satisfies (1) and
(2), and (YX , aX) is an optimum for
sup
a∈RN
{
sup
Y
{
EP [U(X + Y )] | EQjX
[
Y j
]
≤ aj ∀j = 1, . . . , N
}
|
N∑
n=1
an = A
}
(5)
where U(·) is defined in (4). Notice that the setup and results in [5] can be recovered from the ones
in this paper by setting Λ = 0. As explained in Section 5.3, we prove existence, uniqueness, Pareto
optimality of an mSORTE under three different setups of assumptions. A detailed study of these
assumptions is collected in Section 5.5. In Section 5.6 we also compare such assumptions with the
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one considered in [5]. We stress here that such assumptions are reasonably weak and weaker than
those assumed in [5]. Just to mention a few examples, any of the following multivariate utility
functions satisfy our assumptions:
U(x) :=
N∑
j=1
uj(x
j) + u
 N∑
j=1
βjx
j
 , with βj ≥ 0, for all j, (6)
where u : R→ R, for some p > 1, is any one of the following functions:
uexp(x) := 1−exp (−px) ; up(x) =
 p xx+1 x ≥ 01− |x− 1|p x < 0 ; uatan(x) =
 p arctan(x) x ≥ 01− |x− 1|p x < 0 .
and u1, . . . , uN are exponential utility functions (uj(x
j) = 1− exp (−αjxj), α > 0) for any choice
of u as above, or uj(x
j) = upj (x
j), pj > p for u = up or u = uatan. The function Λ could also be
construct as follows. Let G : RN→ R be convex, monotone decreasing and bounded from below,
and F : R→ R be concave and monotone decreasing on range(G). Then Λ : RN→ R defined by
Λ(x) = F (G(x)) (7)
is concave, monotone increasing and bounded above by F (inf G). Notice that, as detailed in Section
4, we will require differentiability only in few circumstances. We here provide an example in
which our assumptions are met, covering the non differentiable case. Take γj ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , N ,
G(x) :=
∑N
j=1 γj(x
j − kj)− and take F : R→ R defined by F (x) := −xα , α ≥ 1, which is concave
and monotone decreasing on range(G) = [0,∞). Then
Λ(x) := −
 N∑
j=1
γj(x
j − kj)−
α (8)
is concave, monotone increasing and bounded above by 0, and U(x) :=
∑N
j=1 uj(x
j) + Λ(x), with
u1, . . . , uN exponential utility functions and Λ assigned in (8), satisfies our assumptions.
Quite remarkably, this generalization of a SORTE allows us to introduce and to study a Nash
Equilibrium property for an mSORTE, as shown in Section 5.3. We prove that, in addition to
being Pareto optimal, the component YX of an mSORTE is a Nash Equilibrium (see Theorem
5.11 and Theorem 5.12). We point out that, in interpreting the component YX as Nash Equi-
librium, we are considering that each agent’s value function is not simply given by its expected
(univariate) utility. In fact, we require that the j−th agent, given all other agents’ positions
Y [−j] = [Y 1, . . . , Y j−1, Y j+1, . . . , Y N ], optimizes the function (see Equation (24))
Z 7→ UY
[−j]
j (Z) := E
[
uj(X
j + Z)
]
+ E
[
Λ(X + [Y [−j], Z])
]
where [Y [−n];Z] :=
[
Y 1, . . . , Y n−1, Z, Y n+1, . . . , Y N
]
.
From a technical perspective, our results can be considered as consequences of Theorem 5.9 and
Theorem 5.10. The proof of Theorem 5.9, which is the most lenghty and complex, is split according
to the Setups we work in. The proofs for Setup A and B (collected in Theorem 6.16) use a
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novel Komlo´s- type argument. This allows us to obtain existence of optimizers for both the
primal and the dual problems without requiring differentiability of U(·), which is a rather unusual
result in the literature. The one for Setup C instead (see Theorem 6.17) is somehow inspired by
Theorem 4.7 in [5], and is based on a minimax argument. A duality result links the content of
Theorems 5.9 and 5.10 yielding the existence result in Theorem 5.11. The uniqueness argument in
Theorem 5.12 is inspired by the corresponding uniqueness result in [5] (Theorem 4.19). We also
remark that, differently from [5], we need to construct the dual system (MΦ,KΦ), where M
Φ is a
multivariate Orlicz Heart having as topological dual space the Ko¨the dual KΦ. Here, we denote
with Φ : (R+)
N → R the multivariate Orlicz function Φ(y) := U(0) − U(− |y|) associated to the
multivariate utility function. Details of this construction are provided in Sections 2 and 3.
As already mentioned, this paper is a somehow natural prosecution of [5]. Thus, as far as the
conceptual aspects are concerned, we refer to the Literature Review in [5] for extended comments.
Here, we limit ourselves to mentioning that [5], and so indirectly this work, originated from the
systemic risk approach developed in Biagini et al. [6] and [7]. For an exhaustive overview on the
literature on systemic risk, see Fouque and Langsam [25] and Hurd [27].
Risk sharing equilibria have been studied in Borch [9], Bu¨hlmann ([10] and [11]) and Bu¨hlmann
and Jewell [12]. In Barrieu and El Karoui [4] inf-convolution of convex risk measures has been
introduced as a fundamental tool for studying risk sharing. Further developments in this direction
have been obtained in Acciaio [1], Filipovic´ and Svindland [23], Jouini and Schachermayer [28],
Mastrogiacomo and Rosazza Gianin [33]. Among other works on risk sharing are also Dana and
Van [16], Embrechts et al. [20], Embrechts et al. [21], Filipovic´ and Kupper [22], Heath and
Ku [26], Tsanakas [40], Weber [41]. Recent further extensions have been obtained in Liebrich
and Svindland [32]. We refer to Carlier d Dana, [14] and [15], for Risk sharing procedures under
multivariate risks. Regarding Multivariate Utility functions, which have been widely exploited in
the study of optimal investment under transaction costs, we cite Campi and Owen [13], Deelestra
et al. [17], Kamizono [29], Pham and Bouchard [35] and references therein.
The paper is organized as follows. The multivariate utility functions used in this paper are intro-
duced is Section 2, while Section 3 is a short account on Multivariate Orlicz Spaces and on the
relevant properties from functional analysis needed in the sequel of the paper. Section 4 is devoted
to the specification of our notations and assumptions. The core of the paper is Section 5, where
we formally present the key concepts and provide our main results. Most of the proofs, as well
as findings of some independent interest, are deferred to Section 6. The Appendix collects some
additional technical results and some of the proofs related to Section 3.
2 Preliminary notations and Multivariate Utility
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and consider the following set of probability vectors on (Ω,F)
PN :=
{
Q = (Q1, ...,QN) | such that Qj ≪ P for all j = 1, ..., N
}
.
For a vector of probability measures Q ∈ PN we write Q ≪ P to denote Q1≪ P , . . . ,QN ≪ P .
Similarly for Q ∼ P . Set L0(Ω,F ,P;RN ) = (L0(P))N . For Q ∈ P1 let L1(Q) :=L1(Ω,F ,Q;R) be
5
the vector space of Q− integrable random variables and L∞(Q) := L∞(Ω,F ,Q;R) be the space
of Q− essentially bounded random variables. Set L1+(Q) =
{
Z ∈ L1(Q)
∣∣Z ≥ 0 Q− a.s.} and
L∞+ (Q) = {Z ∈ L
∞(Q) | Z ≥ 0 Q− a.s.}. For Q ∈ PN let
L1(Q) := L1(Q1)× ...× L1(QN ) , L1+(Q) := L
1
+(Q
1)× ...×L1+(Q
N) ,
L∞(Q) := L∞(Q1)× · · · × L∞(QN ) , L∞+ (Q) := L
∞
+ (Q
1)× · · · × L∞+ (Q
N ).
For each j = 1, ..., N consider a vector subspace Lj with R ⊆ Lj ⊆ L0(Ω,F ,P;R) and set
L:=L1 × ...× LN⊆(L0(P ))N .
One could take as Lj , for example, L∞ or some Orlicz space. With
M⊆ PN
we will denote a subset of probability vectors. Our optimization problems will be defined for the
set M and on the vector space L, to be specified later (see Setups A, B and C in Section 4).
Given a vector y ∈ RN and n ∈ {1, . . . , N} we will denote by y[−n] the vector in RN−1 obtained
suppressing the n-th component of y for N ≥ 2 (and y[−n] = ∅ if N = 1) and we set
[y[−n]; z] :=
[
y1, . . . , yn−1, z, yn+1, . . . , yN
]
∈ RN , for z ∈ R. (9)
Finally, we wil write R+ := [0,+∞) and R++ := (0,+∞).
2.1 Multivariate Utility
Definition 2.1. We say that U : RN → R is a Multivariate Utility Function if it is strictly
concave and increasing with respect to the partial componentwise order. When N = 1 we will use
the term univariate utility function instead. For a multivariate utility function U we define the
convex conjugate in the usual way by
V (y) := sup
x∈RN
(U(x)− 〈x, y〉) . (10)
Observe that by definition U(x) ≤ 〈x, y〉+ V (y) for every x, y ∈ RN , and V (·) ≥ U(0) that is V is
lower bounded. Some useful properties of V are collected in Appendix A.2.
Definition 2.2 ([38] Chapter V). Let f : RN → R be concave and let z ∈ RN be given. We define
the superdifferential of f at z as
∂f(z) := {ν ∈ RN | f(x)− f(z) ≤
N∑
j=1
νj(xj − zj) ∀x ∈ RN}
By an abuse of notation we will denote by ∇f(z) =
[
∂f
∂x1
(z), . . . , ∂f
∂xN
(z)
]
a given choice of a point
in ∂f(z). If N = 1, we will write dfdx (z) for a choice of a point in ∂f(z).
It is well known that ∂f(z) 6= ∅ for any z ∈ RN ([38] Theorem 23.4) and that ∂f(z) consists of a
single point if and only if the function f is differentable in z ([38] Theorem 25.1). More properties
are collected in Section A.0.1.
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Remark 2.3. With the notation of Definition 2.2, given a concave f : RN → R we can write
f(x) ≤
∑N
j=1
∂f
∂xj
(z)(xj − zj)+ f(z) for any x, z ∈ RN . In particular, given concave nondecreasing
u1, . . . , uN . R→ R, all null in 0, for any x
1, . . . , xN ≥ 0
N∑
j=1
uj(x
j) ≤ max
j=1,...,N
(
duj
dxj
(0)
) N∑
j=1
xj . (11)
The following assumption holds true throughout the paper without further mention.
Standing Assumption I. We consider multivariate utilities in the form
U(x) :=
N∑
j=1
uj(x
j) + Λ(x) (12)
where u1, . . . , uj : R → R are univariate utility function and Λ : RN → R is concave, increasing
with respect to the partial componentwise order and bounded from above. Furthermore we assume
that for every ε > 0 there exists a point zε ∈ RN such that
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣ ∂Λ∂xj (zε)
∣∣∣∣ < ε . (13)
We also assume the Inada conditions
lim
x→+∞
uj(x)
x
= 0 and lim
x→−∞
uj(x)
x
= +∞ ∀ j = 1, . . . , N,
and that, without loss of generality, uj(0) = 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . , N .
Observe that such multivariate utility is split in two components: the sum of single agent utility
functions and a universal part Λ that could be either selected upon agreement by all the agents or
could be imposed by a regulatory institution. As Λ is not necessarily strictly convex nor strictly
increasing, we may choose Λ = 0, which corresponds to the case analyzed in [5].
Remark 2.4. Condition (13) is inspired by Asymptotic Satiability as defined in Definition 2.13 in
[13]. To be more explicit and in view of Definition 2.2, (13) means: for every ε > 0 there exists a
zε ∈ RN and a selection νε ∈ ∂Λ(zε), such that
∑N
j=1
∣∣νjε ∣∣ < ε .
Remark 2.5. U(·) defined in (12) is a Multivariate Utility Function as introduced in Definition 2.1
since it inherits strict concavity and strict monotonicity from u1, . . . , uN . We may assume without
loss of generality that uj(0) = 0 ∀ j = 1, . . . , N , since we can always write
U(x) =
N∑
j=1
(
uj(x
j)− uj(0)
)
+
Λ(x) + N∑
j=1
uj(0)
 .
Thus, we can always redefine the univariate utilities and the multivariate one, without affecting
other assumptions, in such a way that univariate utilities are null in 0.
In the following we will make extensive use of the following properties, without explicit mention:
for every f : R→ R nondecreasing and such that f(0) = 0 it holds that
f(x) = f(x+) + f(−x−), (f(x))+ = f
(
x+
)
(14)
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For each j = 1, . . . , N we define the convex conjugate of uj by
vj(y) := sup
x∈R
(uj(x)− xy) y ∈ R (15)
Remark 2.6. We observe that v1, . . . , vN are finite valued on (0,+∞) by the Inada conditions
and bounded below by u1(0), . . . , uN(0) respectively. Since V as defined in (10) satisfies V (y) ≤∑N
j=1 vj(y
j) + supz∈RN Λ(z), we infer that V (·) is finite valued on (0,+∞)
N .
3 Multivariate Orlicz Spaces
Given a univariate Young function φ : R+ → R we can associate to it its conjugate function
φ∗(y) := supx∈R (x |y| − φ(x)). As in [36], we can associate to both φ and φ
∗ the Orlicz Spaces
and Hearts Lφ,Mφ, Lφ
∗
,Mφ
∗
.
We now introduce multivariate Orlicz functions and spaces. The following definition is a slight
modification of the one in Appendix B of [3].
Definition 3.1. A function Φ : (R+)
N → R is said to be a multivariate Orlicz function if it null
in 0, convex, continuous, increasing in the usual partial order and satisfies: there exist A > 0, b
constants such that Φ(x) ≥ A ‖x‖ − b ∀x ∈ (R+)
N .
For a given multivariate Orlicz function Φ we define, as in [3], the Orlicz Space and the Orlicz
Heart respectively:
LΦ :=
{
X ∈ L0
(
(Ω,F ,P); [−∞,+∞]N
)
| ∃λ ∈ (0,+∞),EP [Φ(λ |X |)] < +∞
}
MΦ :=
{
X ∈ L0
(
(Ω,F ,P); [−∞,+∞]N
)
| ∀λ ∈ (0,+∞),EP [Φ(λ |X |)] < +∞
}
(16)
where |X | :=
[∣∣Xj∣∣]N
j=1
is the componentwise absolute value. We introduce the Luxemburg norm
as the functional
‖X‖Φ := inf
{
λ > 0 | EP
[
Φ
(
1
λ
|X |
)]
≤ 1
}
defined on L0
(
(Ω,F ,P); [−∞,+∞]N
)
and taking values in [0,+∞].
Lemma 3.2. Let Φ be a multivariate Orlicz function. Then
1. The Luxemburg norm is finite on X if and only if X ∈ LΦ.
2. The Luxemburg norm is in fact a norm on LΦ, which makes it a Banach Space.
3. MΦ is a vector subspace of LΦ, closed under Luxemburg norm, and is a Banach space itself
if endowed with the Luxemburg norm.
4. LΦ is continuously embedded in (L1(P))N .
5. Convergence in Luxemburg norm implies convergence in probability.
6. X ∈ LΦ,
∣∣Y j∣∣ ≤ ∣∣Xj∣∣ ∀j = 1, . . . , N implies Y ∈ LΦ, and the same holds for the Orlicz
Hearth. In particular X ∈ LΦ implies X± ∈ LΦ and the same holds for the Orlicz Heart.
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7. The topology of ‖·‖Φ on M
Φ is order continuous and MΦ is the closure of (L∞)N in Lux-
emburg norm.
8. MΦ and LΦ are Banach lattices if endowed with the topology induced by ‖·‖Φ and with the
componentwise P-almost sure order.
Proof. Claims (1)-(5) follow as in [3]. (6) is trivial from (5). As to (7), sequential order continuity
is an application of (DOM), and order continuity follows from Theorem 1.1.3 in [19]. (8) is evident.
Now we need to work a bit on duality.
Definition 3.3. The Ko¨the dual KΦ of the space L
Φ is defined as
KΦ :=
Z ∈ L0 ((Ω,F ,P); [−∞,+∞]N) |
N∑
j=1
XjZj ∈ L1(P), ∀X ∈ LΦ
 . (17)
Proposition 3.4. KΦ is a subspace of the topological dual of L
Φ and is a subset of (L1(P))N .
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
By Proposition 3.4 KΦ is a normed space which can be naturally endowed by the dual norm of
continuous linear functionals, which we will denote by ‖Z‖∗Φ := sup
{
|
∑N
j=1X
jZj | | ‖X‖Φ ≤ 1
}
.
This norm will play here the role of the Orlicz norm, and the relation between the two norms
‖·‖Φ and ‖·‖
∗
Φ is well understood in the univariate case (see Theorem 2.2.9 in [19]). The following
Proposition summarizes useful properties which show how the Ko¨the dual can play the role of the
Orlicz space LΦ
∗
for MΦ in univariate theory, and are the counterparts to Corollary 2.2.10 in [19].
Proposition 3.5. The following hold:
1. KΦ =
{
Z ∈ L0
(
(Ω,F ,P); [−∞,+∞]N
)
|
∑N
j=1X
jZj ∈ L1(P), ∀X ∈MΦ
}
.
2. The topological dual of (MΦ, ‖·‖Φ) is (KΦ, ‖·‖
∗
Φ).
3. Suppose LΦ = LΦ1 × · · ·×LΦN . Then we have that KΦ = LΦ
∗
1 × · · ·×LΦ
∗
N where this is only
meant as equality of sets.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
Definition 3.6. For a multivariate utility function U specified in (12), we define the function Φ
on (R+)
N by
Φ(y) := U(0)− U(− |y|) (18)
and
Φj(z) := uj(0)− uj(− |z|), z ∈ R , (19)
as the (univariate) functions associated to the univariate utilities u1, . . . , uN .
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Remark 3.7. Notice that Φ is a multivariate Orlicz function, which generate multivariate Orlicz
Space and Orlicz Heart, and Φ1, . . . ,ΦN are univariate Orlicz functions. To prove these claims, we
only need to verify the existence of A > 0, b given in Definition 3.1. We first consider the univariate
case. By Proposition A.1 for b = uj(0) and M =
d+uj
dx (0), we have uj(−x
j) ≤ M(−xj) + b for
all xj > 0 and j = 1, . . . , N . As a consequence Φ(xj) ≥ Mxj + uj(0) − b for all xj > 0 and
j = 1, . . . , N . We also notice that
d+uj
dx (0) > 0 by strict monotonicity of uj . The multivariate case
follows from the univariate one: we have the inequality Φ(x) ≥
∑N
j=1 Φj(x
j) − supRN (Λ) + Λ(0)
and by assumption u1, . . . , uN are univariate utilities.
Remark 3.8. The conjugates functions of Φ1, . . . ,ΦN will be denoted by Φ
∗
1, . . . ,Φ
∗
N .. To each of
these functions Φ1, . . . ,ΦN and Φ
∗
1, . . . ,Φ
∗
N we can associate Orlicz Spaces and Orlicz Hearts. The
relationship between the convex conjugate vj of uj and the conjugate Φ
∗
j of Φj is
Φ∗j (y) =
{
0 |y| ≤ βj
vj(|y|)− vj(βj) |y| > βj
,
where βj :=
d−uj
dx (0). When uj is bounded from above, vj is also bounded in a neighborhood of 0
(vj(0) = u(+∞) < +∞), and consequently an integrability condition of the form EP[Φ∗j (·)] < +∞
holds true if and only if EP[vj(·)] < +∞.
We now provide an example connecting the multivariate theory to the univariate classical one.
Remark 3.9. Even thought we will not make this assumption in the rest of the paper, suppose
in this Remark that Φ(x) =
∑N
j=1 Φj(x
j) for univariate Orlicz functions, that is each separately
satisfying Definition 3.1 for N = 1. Then we could consider the multivariate spaces LΦ and MΦ
as above or we could take LΦ1 × · · · × LΦN and MΦ1 × · · · ×MΦN .
As shown in Appendix A.3, the following identity between sets holds:
MΦ =MΦ1 × · · · ×MΦN and LΦ = LΦ1 × · · · × LΦN
and furthermore
1
N
N∑
j=1
∥∥Xj∥∥
Φj
≤ ‖X‖Φ ≤ N
N∑
j=1
∥∥Xj∥∥
Φj
. (20)
Observe that in the setup of this Remark, from Proposition 3.5 Item 3, we have
KΦ = L
Φ∗1 × · · · × LΦ
∗
N .
4 Setup and Assumptions
Define
CR :=
Y ∈ (L0(Ω,F , P ))N |
N∑
j=1
Y j ∈ R
 (21)
that is, CR is the set of random vectors such that the sum of the components is P-a.s. a deterministic
number. The following assumption holds true throughout the paper without further mention.
Standing Assumption II. B ⊆ CR is a convex cone, closed in probability, 0 ∈ B, RN + B = B.
The vector X belongs to the Orlicz Heart MΦ.
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Observe that the Standing Assumption II implies that all constant vectors belong to B, so that
all (deterministic) vector in the form ei − ej (differences of elements in the canonical base of RN )
belong to B ∩MΦ. We recall the following concept, introduced in [6] Definition 5.15.
Definition 4.1. B is closed under truncation if for each Y ∈ B there exists mY ∈ N and cY ∈ R
N
such that
∑N
j=1 Y
j =
∑N
j=1 c
j
Y and for all m ≥ mY
Ym := Y 1{|Y j |<m∀j=1,...,N} + cY 1Ω\{|Y j |<m∀j=1,...,N} ∈ B .
Some of the following assumptions will be needed for some of our main results. However, unlike
for Standing Assumptions I and II, it will be always explicitly mentioned if and when these are
assumed.
Assumption 4.2. B is closed under truncation.
As pointed out in [6], B = CR is closed under truncation. Closedness under truncation property
holds true for a rather wide class of constraints. For a more detailed explanation and examples,
see also [5] Example 3.15 and Example 4.22.
Assumption 4.3. LΦ = LΦ1 × · · · × LΦN
While Assumption 4.2 is a requirement on the set of random allocations, Assumption 4.3 is a request
on the utility functions we allow for. It can be rephrased as: if forX ∈ (L0 ((Ω,F ,P); [−∞,+∞]))N
there exist λ1, . . . , λN > 0 such that EP
[
uj(−λj
∣∣Xj∣∣)] > −∞, then there exists α > 0 such that
EP [Λ(−α |X |)] > −∞. This request is rather weak and there are many examples of choices of U
and Λ that guarantee this condition is met (see Section 5.5.1). Note however that this is not a
request on the topological spaces, but just an integrability requirement, and it is automatically
satisfied if Λ = 0.
Assumption 4.4. u1, . . . , uN satisfy AE−∞, that is: u1, . . . , uN are differentiable on R and
lim inf
x→−∞
xu′j(x)
uj(x)
> 1 ∀ j = 1, . . . , N .
Assumption 4.5. The function V , defined in (10), satisfies the following condition: for every
Q = [Q1, . . . ,QN ]≪ P with EP
[
V
(
λdQdP
)]
< +∞ for some λ > 0 it holds that
EP
[
V
([
λ1
dQ1
dP
, . . . , λN
dQN
dP
])]
< +∞ ∀λ1, . . . , λN > 0 .
As explained in Section 5.5.3, in the case N = 1 the Assumption 4.5 is a condition associated to
Reasonable Asymptotic Elasticity, introduced [39], and is the classical one needed for the validity
of many results in the theory of univariate utility maximization, see for example [31] and [39].
In Section 5.5, we provide further details and sufficient conditions for these assumptions, which
show that these are reasonable.
We here only note that in case Λ = 0 we will obtain the same results of [5] but under weaker
assumptions. A more precise formulation of this fact can be found in Section 5.6.
We introduce the following sets:
11
1. For any A ∈ R consider the set of random allocations
BA := B ∩
Y ∈ (L0)N :
N∑
j=1
Y j ≤ A
 ⊆ CR . (22)
2. Q is the set of vectors of probability measuresQ = [Q1, . . . ,QN ], with Qj ≪ P ∀ j = 1, . . . , N ,
defined by
Q :=
Q |
[
dQ1
dP
. . . ,
dQ1
dP
]
∈ KΦ,
N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Y j
]
≤ 0 ∀Y ∈ B0 ∩M
Φ
 . (23)
Identifying Radon-Nikodym derivatives and measures in the natural way, this can be rephrased
as: Q is the set of normalized (i.e. with componentwise expectations equal to 1), non negative
vectors in the polar of B0 ∩M
Φ, in the dual system (MΦ,KΦ).
3. QV is the following subset of Q:
QV :=
{
Q ∈ Q | EP
[
V
(
λ
dQ
dP
)]
< +∞ for some λ > 0
}
.
We are now ready to specify the framework that will be adopted in our main results. To this end,
we will consider three sets of assumptions:
Setup A Assumption 4.2 and Assumption 4.3 are fulfilled and we set L :=
⋂
Q∈QV
L1(Q) and M :=
QV .
Setup B Assumption 4.3 and Assumption 4.4 are fulfilled and we set L :=
⋂
Q∈QV
L1(Q) and M :=
QV .
Setup C Assumption 4.5 is fulfilled, u1, . . . , uN are differentiable on R, Λ is differentiable on R
N and
we set L := L0(P)× · · · × L0(P) and M := QV .
Recall from (9) that we set
[Y [−n];Z] :=
[
Y 1, . . . , Y n−1, Z, Y n+1, . . . , Y N
]
∈ (L0(P))N , for Z ∈ L0(P).
Consider a Multivariate Utility U . For (Y,Q, a, A) ∈ (L ∩ L1(Q))×M×RN×R define:
UY
[−j]
j (Z) := E
[
uj(X
j + Z)
]
+ E
[
Λ(X + [Y [−j], Z])
]
, Z ∈ L0(P), j = 1, . . . , N. (24)
U
Q
j ,Y [−j]
j (a
j) := sup
{
UY
[−j]
j (Z) | Z ∈ L
j ∩ L1(Qj), EQj [Z] ≤ a
j
}
, j = 1, . . . , N (25)
TQ(a) := sup
{
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ L ∩ L
1(Q), EQj
[
Y j
]
≤ aj , ∀j = 1, . . . , N
}
, (26)
SQ(A) := sup
TQ(a) | a ∈ RN ,
N∑
j=1
aj ≤ A
 . (27)
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Obviously, all such quantities depend also on X , but as X will be kept fixed throughout most of the
analysis, we may avoid to explicitly specify this dependence in the notations. As u1, . . . , uN ,Λ, U
are increasing we can replace, in the definitions (25), (26), (27), the inequalities in the budget
constraints with equalities. Moreover, it is clear that when Λ = 0 the problem SQX (A) introduced
in (27) coincides with SQX (A) defined in (3).
Remark 4.6. From the definition of V we obtain the Fenchel inequality
U(X + Y ) ≤ 〈X + Y, λZ〉+ V (λZ) P-a.s. for all X,Y, Z ∈ (L0(P))N , λ ≥ 0.
Recall thatMΦ ⊆ L1(Q) for all Q ∈Q. For all X ∈MΦ, for all Q ∈Q such that
∑N
j=1 EQj
[
Y j
]
≤ A
we then have:
EP [U(X + Y )] ≤ inf
λ≥0
λ
N∑
j=1
EQj
[
(Xj + Y j)
]
+ EP
[
V
(
λ
dQ
dP
)]
≤ inf
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]
+A
+ EP [V (λdQ
dP
)]
and the last expression is finite if Q ∈QV . Therefore, for all Y ∈ B0 ∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] ≤ inf
Q∈QV
inf
λ≥0
λ
N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]
+ EP
[
V
(
λ
dQ
dP
)] < +∞
5 Multivariate Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium
5.1 Main Concepts
Here is the natural generalization of SORTE as introduced in [5]:
Definition 5.1. The triple (YX ,QX , aX) ∈ L×M×RN with Y ∈ L1(QX) is a Weak Multi-
variate Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium (Weak mSORTE) with budget A ∈ R
if:
1) for each j = 1, . . . , N , Y jX is optimal for U
Q
j
X
,Y
[−j]
X
j (a
j
X),
2) aX is optimal for S
QX (A),
3) YX ∈ B and
∑N
j=1 Y
j
X = A P- a.s.
Definition 5.2. The triple (YX ,QX , aX) ∈ L×M×RN with Y ∈ L1(QX) is a Multivariate
Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equilibrium (smSORTE) with budget A ∈ R if
1. (YX , aX) is an optimum for
sup
a∈RN∑N
j=1 aj=A
(
sup
{
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ L ∩ L
1(QX), EQj
X
[
Y j
]
≤ aj , ∀j = 1, . . . , N
})
2. YX ∈ B and
∑N
j=1 Y
j
X = A P- a.s.
When Λ = 0 then the definition of the Weak mSORTE coincides with the one of the SORTE, as
defined in [5]. See Section 5.6 for an accurate comparison.
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Remark 5.3. It follows from the monotonicity of the utility functions that
∑N
j=1 a
j
X = A and
E
Q
j
X
[Y jX ] = a
j
X . Hence
N∑
j=1
E
Q
j
X
[Y jX ] =
N∑
j=1
ajX = A.
and
N∑
j=1
Y jX =
N∑
j=1
E
Q
j
X
[Y jX ] P- a.s. (28)
Lemma 5.4. A Multivariate SORTE is a Weak Multivariate SORTE.
Proof. Let (YX ,QX , aX) ∈ L×M×RN be an mSORTE as in Definition 5.2.
We prove that Item 1 in Definition 5.1 holds true. By Remark 5.3 we have ajX = EQj
X
[Y jX ], j =
1, . . . , N . For any Z ∈ Lj ∩ L1(QjX) with EQjX
[Z] ≤ ajX we have that [Y
[−j]
X ;Z] satisfies then the
constraints of the problem
sup
{
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ L ∩ L
1(QX), EQjX
[
Y j
]
≤ ajX , ∀j
}
and we have by Item 1 of Definition 5.2 that EP [U(X + YX)] ≥ EP
[
U(X + [Y
[−j]
X ;Z]
]
. By simple
computations, this implies U
Y
[−j]
X
j (Y
j
X) ≥ U
Y
[−j]
X
j (Z), yielding the required optimality.
We now move to Item 2 of Definition 5.1:
sup
a∈RN∑N
j=1 a
j=A
TQX (a)
(26)
= sup
a∈RN∑N
j=1 aj=A
(
sup
{
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ L ∩ L
1(QX), EQj
X
[
Y j
]
≤ aj , ∀j
}) Def. 5.2
Item 2=
EP [U(X + YX)]
Rem.5.3
≤
(
sup
{
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ L ∩ L
1(QX), EQjX
[
Y j
]
≤ ajX , ∀j
})
(26)
=
TQX (aX) ≤ sup
a∈RN∑N
j=1 a
j=A
TQX (a)
which implies optimality of aX .
Finally, Item 3 of Definition 5.1 trivially holds, since YX satisfies Item 2 of Definition 5.2.
5.2 Pareto Allocation and Nash Equilibrium
For each j = 1, ..., N , let uj : R→ R and let Λ : R
N → R. Similarly to [5] we give the following
definition:
Definition 5.5. Given a set of feasible allocations V ⊆ (L0(P ))N , Y ∈ V is a Pareto allocation
for V if
Z ∈ V, E
[
uj(X
j + Zj)
]
≥ E
[
uj(X
j + Y j)
]
for all j, and E [Λ(X + Z)] ≥ E [Λ(X + Y )]
(29)
imply:
E
[
uj(X
j + Zj)
]
= E
[
uj(X
j + Y j)
]
for all j, and E [Λ(X + Z)] = E [Λ(X + Y )] .
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In general Pareto allocations are not unique and, not surprisingly, the following version of the First
Welfare Theorem holds true.
Proposition 5.6. Define the optimization problem
Π(V) := sup
Z∈V

N∑
j=1
E
[
uj(X
j + Zj)
]
+ E [Λ(X + Z)]
 . (30)
Whenever Y ∈ V is the unique optimal solution of Π(V), then it is a Pareto allocation for V.
Proof. Let Y be optimal for Π(V), so that E
[∑N
j=1 uj(X
j + Y j)
]
+E [Λ(X + Y )] = Π(V). Suppose
that there exists Z such that (29) holds true. As Z ∈ V we have:
E
 N∑
j=1
uj(X
j + Y j)
+ E [Λ(X + Y )] = Π(V) := sup
W∈V

N∑
j=1
E
[
uj(X
j +W j)
]
+ E [Λ(X +W )]

≥ E
 N∑
j=1
uj(X
j + Zj)
 + E [Λ(X + Z)] ≥ E
 N∑
j=1
uj(X
j + Y j)
+ E [Λ(X + Y )]
by (29). Hence Z is an optimal solution to Π(V). Uniqueness of the optimal solution implies
Z = Y , and the validity of Definition 5.5 follows.
We also introduce a version of a Nash Equilibrium:
Definition 5.7. Given a set of feasible allocations V ⊆ L0(P ), Y ∈ V is a Nash Equilibrium for
V if for every j ∈ {1, . . . , N}
UY
[−j]
j (Y
j) ≥ UY
[−j]
j (Z) for all Z such that [Y
[−j];Z] ∈ V ,
where UY
[−j]
j (·), j = 1, . . . , N are defined in (24).
Assuming that all agents n 6= j adopt strategy Y [−j], in a Nash Equilibrium the strategy Y j of
agent j maximizes his own expected utility plus an additional systemic/regulatory term:
Y j := argmax
{
E
[
uj(X
j + •)
]
+ E
[
Λ(X + [Y [−j], •])
]}
5.3 Main Results
The analysis in [5] regards existence uniqueness and properties of a SORTE. Here we provide suf-
ficient conditions for existence, uniqueness, Pareto optimality and the Nash Equilibrium property
of a mSORTE, see Theorems 5.11 and 5.12. Such results are relatively simple consequences of the
following key duality Theorem 5.9, whose proof in Section 6 will involve several steps.
We introduce the following sets of random vectors, for A ∈ R
L
(A)
V : =
⋂
Q∈QV
Y ∈ (L0(P))N |
N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP
∈ L1(P),EP
 N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP
 ≤ A
 , (31)
LV : = L
(0)
V
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Remark 5.8. For any Q ∈ QV
L
(A)
V ⊆
Y ∈ (L0(P))N |
N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP
∈ L1(P),EP
 N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP
 ≤ A

and then, by Fenchel inequality (using an argument similar to the one in Remark 4.6) we deduce
that the following weak duality holds true
sup
Y ∈L
(A)
V
EP [U(X + Y )] (32)
≤ sup
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ (L0(P))N ,
N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP
∈ L1(P), EP
 N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP
 ≤ A
 (33)
≤ inf
Q∈QV
inf
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]
+A
+ EP [V (λdQ
dP
)] (34)
≤ inf
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
E
Q̂j
[
Xj
]
+A
+ EP [V (λdQ̂
dP
)] < +∞, for any Q̂ ∈ QV . (35)
Theorem 5.9. In either setup A, B or C the following holds:
sup
Y ∈BA∩(L∞(P))N
EP [U(X + Y )] = sup
Y ∈BA∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] (36)
= sup
Y ∈L
(A)
V
EP [U(X + Y )] = min
Q∈QV
min
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]
+A
 + EP [V (λdQ
dP
)] . (37)
Moreover:
1. There exists a unique optimum Ŷ ∈ L
(A)
V to the problem in LHS of (37).
2. Any optimum (λ̂, Q̂) of the RHS of (37) satisfies λ̂ > 0 and Q̂ ∼ P.
3. For any optimum (λ̂, Q̂) of the RHS of (37) we have Ŷ ∈ BA ∩ L ∩ L1(Q̂) and
N∑
j=1
E
Q̂j
[Ŷ j ] = A =
N∑
j=1
Ŷ j , P -a.s..
4. If U is differentiable, there exists a unique optimum (λ̂, Q̂) of the RHS of (37).
Proof. Setup A and B: the case A = 0 is covered in Theorem 6.16 together with the results in
Corollary 6.19 (for the proof of (36)). Setup C: the case A = 0 is covered in Theorem 6.17 (observe
that differentiability of U is assumed in the setup C). In Section 6.6 we then explain how we can
apply also to A 6= 0 the same arguments used for A = 0
The following result is the counterpart to Theorem 5.9, once a vector Q ∈ QV is fixed.
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Theorem 5.10. For either L =
⋂
Q∈QV
L1(Q) or L = (L0(P))N , for every Q ∈ QV and A ∈ R
the following holds:
sup
Y ∈L∩L1(Q)∑N
j=1 EQj [Y
j]≤A
EP [U(X + Y )] = min
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]
+A
 + EP [V (λdQ
dP
)] . (38)
Proof. Consider first A = 0. By Proposition 6.11
min
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]+ EP [V (λdQ
dP
)] = sup
Y ∈MΦ∑N
j=1 EQj [Y
j]≤0
EP [U(X + Y )] .
Observing that MΦ ⊆ L ∩ L1(Q) ⊆ L1(Q), we have
sup
Y ∈MΦ∑N
j=1 EQj [Y
j]≤0
EP [U(X + Y )] ≤ sup
Y ∈L∩L1(Q)∑N
j=1 EQj [Y
j]≤0
EP [U(X + Y )] ≤ sup
Y ∈L1(Q)∑N
j=1 EQj [Y
j]≤0
EP [U(X + Y )]
≤ inf
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]+ EP [V (λdQ
dP
)] ,
by Remark 4.6. The case A = 0 is then proved. The case A 6= 0, instead, follows from Section
6.6.
On the existence of an mSORTE and Nash Equilibrium
Theorem 5.11. In either setup A, B or C a Multivariate Systemic Optimal Risk Transfer Equi-
librium (Ŷ , Q̂, â) ∈ L × QV × RN exists. Furthermore, Q̂ ∼ P and Ŷ is a Nash Equilibrium for
both the sets
VA = L ∩
Y ∈ L1(Q̂) |
N∑
j=1
E
Q̂j
[Y j ] ≤ A

Vâ = L ∩
{
Y ∈ L1(Q̂) | E
Q̂j
[Y j ] ≤ âj ∀ j = 1, . . . , N
}
.
Proof. The proof of the existence of an mSORTE consists in showing that the optimizers (Ŷ , Q̂) in
Theorem 5.9, together with âj := E
Q̂j
[Ŷ j ], j = 1, . . . , N, are an mSORTE. Let Q̂ be an optimizer
of the RHS of (37). Then, from (37),
sup
Y ∈L
(A)
V
EP [U(X + Y )] = min
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
E
Q̂j
[
Xj
]
+A
 + EP [V (λdQ̂
dP
)]
(38)
= sup
Y ∈L∩L1(Q̂)∑N
j=1 EQ̂j [Y
j ]≤A
EP [U(X + Y )] (39)
= sup
a∈RN∑N
j=1 aj=A
(
sup
{
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ L ∩ L
1(Q̂), E
Q̂j
[
Y j
]
≤ aj , ∀ j
})
(40)
= SQ̂(A),
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where (40) is a simple reformulation of (39). By Item 3 of Theorem 5.9, the optimizer Ŷ ∈ L
(A)
V
satisfies the constraints of the problem in (39), hence it is also an optimum for the problem in (39).
We conclude that Ŷ and âj := E
Q̂j
[Ŷ j ], j = 1, . . . , N, provide an optimum to the problem in (40),
so that (Ŷ , â) fulfills the requirements in Item 1 of Definition 5.2 and
∑N
j=1 â
j = A. Furthermore,
from item 3 Theorem 5.9, Ŷ satisfies Ŷ ∈ B and
∑N
j=1 Ŷ
j = A, proving Item 2 in Definition 5.2.
As to the Nash Equilibrium property with respect to VA and Vâ: observe that given Ŷ
1, . . . , Ŷ N
and âj = E
Q̂j
[Ŷ j ], j = 1, . . . , N , we have that {Z | [Ŷ [−k];Z] ∈ VA} = {Z | [Ŷ [−k];Z] ∈ Vâ}. To
check the Nash Equilibrium property, it is then enough to work on the set Vâ only. By Lemma 5.4
an mSORTE is a Weak mSORTE. Item 1 in Definition 5.1 then yields Nash Equilibrium property
for Ŷ .
On uniqueness of an mSORTE and Pareto Optimality
Theorem 5.12. In Setup A and if U is differentiable the Multivariate SORTE (Ŷ , Q̂, â) is unique.
Moreover, the vector Ŷ is a Pareto Allocation for V = BA ∩ L.
Proof. We claim that if (Ŷ , Q̂, Â) is an mSORTE then Ŷ is an optimizer of the LHS of (37) and Q̂
is an optimizer of the RHS of (37). Under the differentiability assumption, the uniqueness of an
mSORTE is then a consequence of the uniqueness of the optimizers in (37) and of the fact that,
by the monotonicity of Λ, u1, . . . , uN , in an mSORTE it holds: â
j = E
Q̂j
[Ŷ j ]. To prove the claim,
let (Ŷ , Q̂, Â) be an mSORTE, so that Ŷ ∈ BA ∩ L and Q̂ ∈ QV . Observe that in the Setup A
the set B is closed under truncation. Therefore, arguing as in Lemma 4.17 of [5], BA ∩ L ⊆ L
(A)
V .
As a consequence, Ŷ ∈ L
(A)
V and EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
≤ sup
Y ∈L
(A)
V
EP [U(X + Y )]. As Q̂ ∈ QV , from
(32)-(35) we then obtain:
EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
≤ sup
Y ∈L
(A)
V
EP [U(X + Y )] (41)
≤ inf
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
E
Q̂j
[
Xj
]
+A
+ EP [V (λdQ̂
dP
)] (42)
= min
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
E
Q̂j
[
Xj
]
+A
+ EP [V (λdQ̂
dP
)] (43)
Thm.5.10
= sup
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ L ∩ L1(Q̂),
N∑
j=1
E
Q̂j
[
Y j
]
≤ A

= sup
a∈RN∑N
j=1 aj=A
(
sup
{
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ L ∩ L
1(Q̂), E
Q̂j
[
Y j
]
≤ aj ∀j
})
(44)
= EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
(45)
where the expression in (44) is a reformulation of the one in the previous line, and (45) holds
true because (Ŷ , Q̂, â) is an mSORTE and therefore Ŷ is an optimizer of the problem in (44).
Notice that Theorem 5.10 guarantees that the inf in (42) is a min. We then deduce that all above
inequalities are equalities and Ŷ ∈ L
(A)
V is an optimizer of the LHS of (37) and Q̂ is an optimizer
of the RHS of (37).
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We conclude proving that Ŷ is a Pareto allocation: in Setup A observe that L ∩ L1(Q̂) = L and
V := BA ∩ L ⊆ L
(A)
V , as already argued at the beginning of the proof. In conclusion we get
EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
≤ sup
Y ∈V
EP [U(X + Y )] ≤ sup
Y ∈L
(A)
V
EP [U(X + Y )] = EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
,
by (41)-(45). Thus Ŷ is the unique optimum, by the strict concavity of U , to the problem Π(V)
given in (30), and Proposition 5.6 can be applied.
5.4 Dependence on X of mSORTE
We study here the dependence of mSORTE on the initial data X . We will work in Setup A, in
such a way that both existence and uniqueness are guaranteed (see Theorem 5.11 and Theorem
5.12).
Proposition 5.13. In Setup A and for B = CR, given an mSORTE (Ŷ , Q̂, â) the variables
dQ̂
dP and
X + Ŷ are σ(X1 + · · ·+XN) (essentially) measurable.
Proof. By Theorem 5.12 there exists a unique mSORTE. Recall the proof of Theorem 5.11, where
we showed that the optimizers (Ŷ , Q̂) in Theorem 5.9, together with âj := E
Q̂j
[Ŷ j ], j = 1, . . . , N,
are the mSORTE. Notice that in this specific case Y := ei1A − ej1A ∈ B ∩MΦ for all i, j. The
same argument used in the proof of Proposition 4.20 of [5] can be then applied with obvious minor
modifications (i.e. using V (·) in place of
∑N
j=1 vj(·) and taking any Q ∈ QV ) to show that
dQ̂
dP is
G := σ(X1 + · · ·+XN)-(essentially) measurable. We stress the fact that, similarly to Proposition
4.20 of [5], all the components of any Q ∈ QV are equal.
We now focus on X + Ŷ : consider Ẑ := EP [X + Y | G]−X (the conditional expectation is taken
componentwise). Then it is easy to check that
∑N
j=1 Ẑ
j =
∑N
j=1 Ŷ
j = A which yields Ẑ ∈ BA. We
now prove that Ẑ ∈ L
(A)
V , by showing that Z ∈ L =
⋂
Q∈QV
L1(Q) (the fact that Ẑ ∈ L
(A)
V follows
then form the fact that L ∩ BA ⊆ L
(A)
V , as argued in the proof of Theorem 5.12). Since X ∈ M
Φ,
it is clearly enough to prove that EP
[
X + Ŷ
∣∣∣G] ∈ L. Observe first that for any given Q≪ P, the
measure QG defined by
dQG
dP := EP
[
dQj
dP
∣∣∣G] satisfies
Q ∈ QV =⇒ QG ∈ QV . (46)
To see this, recall that all the components of Q are equal, hence so are those of QG . Moreover
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Y j
dQjG
dP
]
= EP
 N∑
j=1
Y j
dQ1G
dP
 = N∑
j=1
Y j ≤ 0 ∀Y ∈ B0 ∩M
Φ
and EP
[
V
(
λ
dQj
G
dP
)]
≤ EP
[
V
(
λdQdP
)]
by conditional Jensen Inequality.
Now, for any j = 1, . . . , N and Q ∈ QV
EP
[∣∣EP [Xj + Y j∣∣G]∣∣ dQj
dP
]
≤ EP
[
EP
[
EP
[∣∣Xj + Y j∣∣∣∣G] dQj
dP
∣∣∣∣G]] =
EP
[
EP
[∣∣Xj + Y j∣∣EP [dQj
dP
∣∣∣∣G]∣∣∣∣G]] = EP [∣∣Xj + Y j∣∣EP [dQjdP
∣∣∣∣G]] .
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As a consequence, since by (46) L ⊆ L1(QG) and Ŷ ∈ L, we get X + Ŷ ∈ L
1(Q), and the fact that
Ẑ ∈ L follows.
Finally, observe that EP
[
U
(
X + Ẑ
)]
= EP
[
U
(
EP
[
X + Ŷ
∣∣∣G])] ≥ EP [U(X + Ŷ ] by conditional
Jensen Inequality. Hence Ẑ, which satisfies Ẑ ∈ L ⊆ L
(A)
V , is another optimum for the optimization
problem in (37). By Proposition 6.2, with K = L
(A)
V , we get Ŷ = Ẑ. Since X+ Ẑ is G-(essentially)
measuralbe, so is clearly X + Ŷ .
It is interesting to notice that this dependence on the componentwise sum of X also holds in the
case of Bu¨hlmann’s equilibrium (see [11] page 16, which partly inspired the proof above, and [9]).
Remark 5.14. In the case of clusters of agents, the above result can be clearly generalized (see
Remark 4.21 in [5]).
5.5 On the assumptions and examples
We introduce the following definition, inspired by Definition 2.2.1 [36].
Definition 5.15. Let u : R→ R and u˜ : R→ R. We say that u  u˜ if there exist k ∈ R, c ∈ R+,
C ∈ R+ such that u˜(x) ≥ Cu(cx) + k for each x ≤ 0.
Note that such control is required to hold only for negative values.
5.5.1 Assumption 4.3
We now consider Λ(x) := u
(∑N
j=1 βjx
j
)
for some concave increasing (not necessarily strictly) and
bounded above function u : R→ R.
Proposition 5.16. Let u1, . . . , uN be univariate utility functions and let
U(x) :=
N∑
j=1
uj(x) + u
 N∑
j=1
βjx
j
 , with β1, . . . , βN ≥ 0,
satisfy Standing Assumption I. If uj  u, for each j, then Assumption 4.3 holds true.
Proof. By the concavity of u we have, for every x ∈ RN ,
Λ(x) = u
 N∑
j=1
βjx
j
 = u
 N∑
j=1
βj∑N
n=1 βn
(
N∑
n=1
βn
)
xj
 ≥ N∑
j=1
βj∑N
n=1 βn
u
((
N∑
n=1
βn
)
xj
)
.
(47)
By uj  u, and boundedness from above of u we have for each x ∈ ((−∞, 0])N and from (47)
+∞ > sup
z∈RN
Λ(z) ≥ Λ(x) ≥
N∑
j=1
βj∑N
n=1 βn
(
Cjuj
(
cj
(
N∑
n=1
βn
)
xj
)
+ kj
)
. (48)
If X ∈ LΦ1×· · ·×LΦN , then by definition there exists a λ0 > 0 such that EP
[
uj(λ(−
∣∣Xj∣∣)] > −∞
for every λ ≤ λ0 and j = 1, . . . , N . This and (48) then imply the existence of some λ1 > 0 such
that EP [Λ(−λ |X |)] > −∞ for every λ ≤ λ1, that is X ∈ LΦ.
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5.5.2 The ∆2 condition
In Orlicz space theory the well known ∆2 condition on a Young function Φ : [0,+∞)→ (−∞,∞)
guarantees that LΦ =MΦ. We say that Φ ∈ ∆2 if:
There exists y0 ≥ 0, K > 0 such that Φ(2y) ≤ KΦ(y) ∀ y ≥ y0.
Proposition 5.17. Let Φ : [0,+∞)→ (−∞,∞) be a Young function diffeentiable on (0,+∞) and
let Φ∗ : [0,+∞)→ (−∞,∞) be its conjugate function. Then
lim inf
z→+∞
zΦ′(z)
Φ(z)
> 1 ⇐⇒ Φ∗ ∈ ∆2. (49)
In particular, under Assumptions 4.3 and 4.4 we have Φ∗1, . . . ,Φ
∗
N ∈ ∆2 which implies
KΦ = L
Φ∗1 × · · · × LΦ
∗
N =MΦ
∗
1 × · · · ×MΦ
∗
N (50)
Proof. The equivalence of the two conditions in (49) can be checked along the lines of Theorem 2.3.3
in [36], observing that the argument still works in our slightly more general setup (use Proposition
2.2 [36] in place of Theorem 2.2.(a) [36]). As to the final claim, the first equality in (50) comes
from Assumption 4.3 and Proposition 3.5, Item (3). If u1, . . . , uN satisfy Assumption 4.4 then,
as can be easily checked by direct computation, Φj , j = 1, . . . , N satisfy the condition in LHS of
(49), so that Φ∗j ∈ ∆2, which in turns implies L
Φ∗j =MΦ
∗
j .
5.5.3 Assumption 4.5
First we recall the definition of Reasonable Asymptotic Elasticity that was introduced in [39].
Definition 5.18 ([39] Definition 1.5). Let u : R→ R be concave, non decreasing, differentiable on
R and satisfying the Inada conditions u′(+∞) = 0, u′(−∞) = +∞. We say that u has Reasonable
Asymptotic Elasticity (RAE) if the following conditions are met:
AE−∞ : lim inf
x→−∞
xu′(x)
u(x)
> 1 and AE+∞ : lim sup
x→+∞
xu′(x)
u(x)
< 1 . (51)
It is well known that RAE is implied by a dual formulation in terms of the conjugate of the utility
function, see Corollary 4.2 [39]. We now introduce the following multivariate generalization of such
dual formulation of RAE.
RAEN : For a function V : RN → R we say that V ∈ RAEN if for all j = 1, . . . , N and for
any compact interval [c0, c1] ⊂ (0,+∞) there exists αj > 0, bj ∈ R such that for all vectors
y ∈ RN , with yi ≥ 0 for all i, we have:
V ([y[−j], λyj ]) ≤ αjV (y) + bj for all λ ∈ [c0, c1]. (52)
For N = 1, RAE1 is equivalent to such dual formulation of RAE, see [39] or [8].
We provide three sufficient conditions for Assumption 4.5 to hold true:
Proposition 5.19. Assumption 4.5 is fulfilled under any of the following sets of conditions:
1. Assumption 4.3 and Assumption 4.4 hold. Additionally, u1, . . . , uN are bounded from above.
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2. Λ(x) := u
(∑N
j=1 βjx
j
)
, uj  u for each j = 1, . . . , N (see Definition 5.15), and uj satisfies
RAE for each j (see Definition 5.18).
3. The convex conjugate V (·) of U(·), defined in (10), satisfies V ∈ RAEN .
Proof. Recall that each vj(·) is bounded below. It is also easy to check that
V (y) ≤
N∑
j=1
vj(y
j) + sup
RN
Λ , (53)
thus to prove Item 1 and 2 it is sufficient to show that in either set of conditions, EP
[
V
(
λdQdP
)]
<
+∞ for some λ > 0 implies
EP
[
vj
(
λ
dQj
dP
)]
< +∞ ∀λ > 0, ∀ j = 1, . . . , N (54)
Item 1: Lemma A.9 implies that dQdP ∈ KΦ. By Proposition 5.17 KΦ =M
Φ∗1 × · · · ×MΦ
∗
N . Then
EP
[
Φ∗j (λ
dQ
dP
j
)
]
< +∞ for all λ > 0 and j = 1, . . . , N . By boundedness above of utilities and
Remark 3.8, we then deduce (54).
Item 2: From the computations in (47) we get: for some Cj > 0, cj > 0
V (y) = sup
x∈RN
 N∑
j=1
uj(x
j)− xjyj + u
 N∑
j=1
βjx
j
 ≥ sup
x∈RN
 N∑
j=1
uj(x
j)− xjyj +
N∑
j=1
Cju(cjx
j)

which implies
V (y) ≥
N∑
j=1
sup
xj∈R
(
uj(x
j)− xjyj + Cju(cjx
j)
)
. (55)
Observe now that since uj  u, j = 1, . . . , N we can apply Lemma A.8 to each term in the
summation in RHS of (55). Calling the corresponding constants βj , Bj ,Kj1 ,K
j
2 , from (55) and
EP
[
V
(
λdQdP
)]
< +∞ we infer that for each j = 1, . . . , N ,
EP
[
vj
(
λ
dQj
dP
)
1{
λ dQ
j
dP ≤K
j
1
}
]
< +∞ EP
[
vj
(
βλ
dQj
dP
)
1{
λ dQ
j
dP ≥K
j
2
}
]
< +∞ .
Since for each j = 1, . . . , N uj satisfies RAE, so do x 7→ uj(x) + 1, j = 1, . . . , N . From [39]
Corollary 4.2, Item (i) applied to x 7→ uj(x) + 1, j = 1, . . . , N , the above equations imply
EP
[
vj
(
α
dQj
dP
)
1{
dQj
dP ≤
K
j
1
λ
}
]
< +∞ EP
[
vj
(
α
dQj
dP
)
1{
dQj
dP ≥
K
j
2
λ
}
]
< +∞ ∀α > 0 .
Since v1, . . . , vN are continuous on
[
K
j
1
λ
,
K
j
2
λ
]
, we have for each j = 1, . . . , N
EP
[
vj
(
α
dQj
dP
)]
< +∞ ∀α > 0 .
Item 3: Fix β ∈ R, β > 0, and Q = (Q1, ...,QN ), Qj ≪ P, such that EP
[
V
(
β dQdP
)]
< +∞. Take
any λ = (λ1, ..., λN ) ∈ RN , with λi > 0 for all i, and set c0 := mini(
λi
β
) > 0, c1 := maxi(
λi
β
). By
the definition of RAEN we then get, for any y ∈ RN with non negative components,
V (λ1y
1, ..., λNy
N) = V
(
λ1
β
βy1, ...,
λN
β
βyN
)
≤ α1V
(
βy1,
λ2
β
βy2, ...,
λN
β
βyN
)
+ b1
≤ α1 · ... · αNV (βy) + constant.
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Hence
EP
[
V
(
λ1
dQ1
dP
, ..., λN
dQN
dP
)]
≤ α1 · ... · αNEP
[
V
(
β
dQ
dP
)]
+ constant < +∞,
by assumption.
5.5.4 Main Examples
Suppose that Λ(x) := u
(∑N
j=1 βjx
j
)
for a function u : R → R which is incresing and concave
(both not necessairly strictly) and such that uj  u for each j = 1, . . . , N .
• If uj satisfies AE−∞ for each j, then the assumptions in Setup B are fulfilled (Proposition
5.16) and Theorem 6.16 holds true.
• If uj satisfies RAE (i.e.: AE+∞ and AE−∞ ) for each j and u is differentiable on R, then the
assumptions in Setup B and C are fulfilled (Proposition 5.19, Item 2) and both Theorems 6.16
and 6.17 hold true. The uniqueness of the optimal solution implies that the Ŷ in Theorem
6.17 satisfies all the conditions in Theorem 6.16.
It is now easy to verify that any of the multivariate utility functions described in equation (6) and
(8) of the Introduction fulfill either Setups A or B or C.
5.6 Comparison with univariate SORTE
In this subsection we set Λ = 0. It is easy to see that if an optimum exists for UY
[−j],Qj
j (·) in
(25), it no longer depends on Y [−j], and the optimization problem UY
[−j],Qj
j (·) is in fact the same
problem denoted with UQ
j
j (·) in Equation (11),[5]. Similarly, it can be seen that the optimization
problem expressed by (27) is, when Λ = 0, equivalent to the one in Equation (12), [5] and with
(3).
When Λ = 0, Assumption 4.2 and Assumption 4.4 are left untouched, Assumption 4.3 is satisfied
automatically, Assumption 4.5 can be equivalently reformulated as: for each j = 1, . . . , N and any
Qj ≪ P,
EP
[
vj
(
λ
dQj
dP
)]
< +∞ for some λ > 0⇒ EP
[
vj
(
λ
dQj
dP
)]
< +∞ for all λ > 0 , (56)
where the convex conjugate vj of uj is given in (15). We recognize that (56) is Assumption 4.1 in
[5]. Thus from Theorem 5.11 we obtain the existence of a SORTE.
Corollary 5.20. Let Λ = 0 and let u1, . . . , uj : R→ R be strictly increasing, strictly concave and
satisfying the Inada conditions (see Standing Assumption I). Then under either Assumption 4.2
or 4.4 or 4.5 a SORTE exists, that is there exists a triple (Ŷ , Q̂, â) ∈ L ×M× RN such that:
1. Ŷ j is an optimum for U Q̂
j
j (â
j), for each j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
2. â is an optimum for SQ̂(A)
3. Ŷ ∈ B and
∑N
j=1 Ŷ
j = A
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In [5] the existence of a SORTE is proved assuming RAE for u1, . . . , uN (see Definition 5.18).
Here, such result is generalized assuming either B is closed under truncation 8with no differentia-
bility requirement on u1, . . . , uN) or AE−∞ only. Moreover, in [5] uniqueness is proved assuming
additionally closedness under truncation. As Assumption 4.3 is satisfied automatically if Λ = 0,
we showed in Theorem 5.12 that closedness under truncation alone is in fact sufficient also for
existence.
6 Systemic Utility Maximization and Duality
6.1 Preliminary Study
In this Section as well as in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 we work only under the Standing Assumptions I
and II only. We present here some results (well posedness and uniqueness) for generic sets C or K.
In subsequent sections these will be applied to specific convex cones, as B0 and LV .
Theorem 6.1. Let C ⊆ CR be convex, closed in probability and such that C ∩MΦ is nonempty.
Assume there exists an A ∈ R such that
∑N
j=1 Y
j ≤ A for every Y ∈ C ∩MΦ. Then for every
X ∈MΦ there exists a Ŷ ∈ C ∩ L1(P) such that
−∞ < sup
Y ∈C∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] ≤ EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
< +∞ . (57)
Proof. First observe that X + Y ≥ − (|X |+ |Y |) in the componentwise order, hence for Z ∈
C ∩MΦ 6= ∅
sup
Y ∈C∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] ≥ EP [U(X + Z)] ≥ EP [U (−(|X |+ |Z|))] > −∞ as X,Z ∈M
Φ.
Take now a maximizing sequence (Yn)n in C ∩MΦ and observe that
sup
n
∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Xj + Y jn
]∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Xj
]∣∣∣∣∣∣+ |A| < +∞
and EP [U(X + Yn)] ≥ EP [U(X + Y1)] =: B ∈ R. Then Lemma A.4 Item 1 applies with Zn :=
X + Yn. Using also
∣∣Xj∣∣+ ∣∣Y jn ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣Xj + Y jn ∣∣+ 2 ∣∣Xj∣∣ , j = 1, . . . , N we get
sup
n
N∑
j=1
EP
[∣∣Xj∣∣+ ∣∣Y jn ∣∣] <∞ .
Now we apply Corollary A.12 with P1 = . . . ,PN = P and extract the subsequence (Ynh)h such
that for some Ŷ ∈ (L1(P))N
WH :=
1
H
H∑
h=1
Ynh −−−−−→
H→+∞
Ŷ P− a.s. and sup
H
N∑
j=1
EP
[∣∣∣W jH ∣∣∣] < +∞ . (58)
We observe that by convexity the random vectors WH still belong to C ∩ MΦ, and Ŷ ∈ C by
closedness in probability. Observe now that
EP [U(X +WH)] ≥
1
H
H∑
h=1
EP [U(X + Ynh)] −−−−−→
H→+∞
sup
Y ∈C∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] (59)
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by concavity of U and the fact that (Ynh)h is again a maximizing sequence. From the expression
in Equation (59) we get that for every ε > 0, definitely (in H)
EP [U(X +WH)] ≥ sup
Y ∈C∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )]− ε
Apply now Lemma A.4 Item 2 for B = supY ∈C∩MΦ EP [U(X + Y )]−ε to the sequence (X+WH)H
for H big enough (this sequence is bounded in (L1(P))N by (58)) to get that for every ε > 0.
EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
≥ sup
Y ∈C∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )]− ε
Clearly then Ŷ satisfies
EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
≥ sup
Y ∈C∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] .
Now observe that by Lemma A.2 for some a > 0, b ∈ R
U(X + Ŷ ) ≤ a
N∑
j=1
(Xj + Ŷ j) + a
N∑
j=1
(−(Xj + Ŷ j)−) + b
and since RHS is in L1(P) we conclude that EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
< +∞.
We have also a uniqueness property.
Proposition 6.2. Let K ⊆ (L0(P))N be convex and X ∈MΦ be given. If supY ∈K EP [U(X + Y )] <
+∞ then the maximization problem supY ∈K EP [U(X + Y )] admits at most one solution.
Furthermore if there exists a Ŷ ∈ (L0(P))N such that
sup
Y ∈K
EP [U(X + Y )] ≤ EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
< +∞
then we have
sup
Y ∈K
EP [U(X + Y )] < sup
z∈RN
U(z) .
Proof. The existence of one optimum at most follows from strict concavity of U (see Standing
Assumption I): if two distinct optima existed, any strict convex combination of the two would
belong to K and would produce a value for EP [U(X + •)] strictly greater than the supremum.
The final claim is trivial if supz∈RN U(z) = +∞. Suppose that supz∈RN U(z) < +∞ and notice
that
sup
Y ∈K
EP [U(X + Y )] ≤ EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
≤ sup
z∈RN
U(z).
If we had supY ∈K EP [U(X + Y )] = supz∈RN U(z), then we would also have
sup
z∈RN
U(z) = EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
so that:
0 = EP
[
sup
z∈RN
U(z)− U(X + Ŷ )
]
= EP
[∣∣∣∣ sup
z∈RN
U(z)− U(X + Ŷ )
∣∣∣∣] ,
which implies supz∈RN U(z) = U(X + Ŷ ) almost surely. In particular, from the fact that X + Ŷ is
finite almost surely, it would follow that U almost surely attains its supremum on some compact
subset of RN , which is clearly a contradiction given that U is strictly componentwise increasing
(see Standing Assumption I).
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Theorem 6.3. Let C ⊆MΦ be a convex cone with 0 ∈ C and ei−ej ∈ C for every i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Denote by C0 the polar of the cone C in the dual pair (MΦ,KΦ):
C0 :=
Z ∈ KΦ |
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Y jZj
]
≤ 0 ∀Y ∈ C

and set
C01 :=
{
Z ∈ C0 | EP
[
Zj
]
= 1 ∀j = 1, . . . , N
}
(C01)
+ :=
{
Z ∈ C01 | Z
j ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , N
}
.
Suppose that for every X ∈MΦ
sup
Y ∈C
EP [U(X + Y )] < +∞ .
Then the following holds:
sup
Y ∈C
EP [U(X + Y )] = min
λ≥0,Q∈(C01)
+
λ N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]
+ EP
[
V
(
λ
dQ
dP
)] . (60)
If any of the two expressions is strictly smaller than V (0) = supRN U , then the condition λ ≥ 0 in
(60) can be replaced with the condition λ > 0.
Proof. The proof can be obtained with minor and obvious modifications of the one in [5] Theorem
A.3 by replacing
∑N
j=1 uj(·),
∑N
j=1 vj(·), L
Φ∗ there with U(·), V (·), KΦ respectively.
We also provide an analogous result when working with the pair ((L∞(P))N , (L1(P))N ) in place of
(MΦ,KΦ), which will be used in Section 6.5.
Theorem 6.4. Replacing MΦ with (L∞(P))N and KΦ with (L
1(P))N in the statement of Theorem
6.3, all the claims in it remain valid.
Proof. As in Theorem 6.3, the proof can be obtained with minor and obvious modifications of the
one in Theorem A.3 of [5], using Theorem 4 of [37] in place of Corollary on pg.534 of [37].
6.2 Duality
We first state some simple properties of the polar cone of B0 ∩MΦ.
Remark 6.5. If X ∈ MΦ, then for any fixed k = 1, . . . , N we have [0, . . . , 0, Xk, 0, . . . , 0] ∈ MΦ.
This in turns implies that for any Z ∈ KΦ and X ∈MΦ, XjZj ∈ L1(P) for any j = 1, . . . , N .
Remark 6.6. In the dual pair (MΦ,KΦ) take the polar (B0 ∩MΦ)0 of B0 ∩MΦ. Since all (deter-
ministic) vector in the form ei−ej belong to B0∩MΦ, we have that for all Z ∈ (B0∩MΦ)0 and for
all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} EP
[
Zi
]
− EP
[
Zj
]
≤ 0. It is clear that, as a consequence, Z ∈ (B0 ∩MΦ)0 ⇒
EP
[
Z1
]
= · · · = EP
[
ZN
]
. Recall that R+ := {b ∈ R, b ≥ 0} and the definition of Q provided in
(23). We then see:
(B0 ∩M
Φ)0 ∩ (L0+)
N = R+ · Q (61)
That is, (B0 ∩MΦ)0 is the cone generated by Q.
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Remark 6.7. The condition B ⊆ CR implies B0 ∩M
Φ ⊆ (CR ∩M
Φ ∩ {
∑N
j=1 Y
j ≤ 0}), so that the
polars satisfy the opposite inclusion: (CR ∩MΦ ∩ {
∑N
j=1 Y
j ≤ 0})0 ⊆ (B0 ∩MΦ)0. Observe now
that any vector [Z, . . . , Z], for Z ∈ L∞+ , belongs to (CR ∩M
Φ ∩ {
∑N
j=1 Y
j ≤ 0})0. In particular, as
a consequence, (B0 ∩MΦ)0 contains a vector in the form [
ε+Z
1+ε , . . . ,
ε+Z
1+ε ] with ε > 0 and Z ∈ L
∞
+ ,
EP [Z] = 1. Each component of such a vector has expectation equal to 1, is in L
∞
+ and satisfies
ε+Z
1+ε ≥
ε
1+ε . All of these conditions together imply that in Q there exists a strictly positive vector
dQ
dP with EP
[
V
(
dQ
dP
)]
<∞, hence belonging to QV . In particular
QV 6= ∅
and there exists a Q = [Q1, . . . ,QN ] ∈ QV with Qj ∼ P, j = 1, . . . , N and ε ≤
dQj
dP ≤ M, j =
1, . . . , N for some 0 < ε < M < +∞ real numbers.
Proposition 6.8 (Fairness). For all Q ∈ Q
N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Y j
]
≤
N∑
j=1
Y j ∀Y ∈ B ∩MΦ .
Proof. Let Y ∈ B∩MΦ. Notice that the hypothesis RN+B = B implies that the vector Y0, defined
by Y j0 := Y
j − 1
N
∑N
k=1 Y
k, belongs to B0. Indeed,
∑N
k=1 Y
k ∈ R and so Y0 ∈ B and
∑N
j=1 Y
j
0 = 0.
By definition of polar,
∑N
j=1 EP
[
Y j0 Z
j
]
≤ 0 for all Z ∈ (B ∩MΦ)0, and in particular for all Q ∈ Q
0 ≥
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Y j0
dQj
dP
]
=
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Y j
dQj
dP
]
−
N∑
j=1
EP
[
1
N
(
N∑
k=1
Y k
)
dQj
dP
]
=
N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Y j
]
−
N∑
j=1
Y j .
Recall the Definition of L
(A)
V in (31) and that LV := L
(0)
V . It follows from these that
LV :=
⋂
Q∈QV
Y ∈ (L0(P))N |
N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP
∈ L1(P),EP
 N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP
 ≤ 0
 . (62)
Observe that we are not requiring that each term Y j dQ
j
dP is integrable, for Y ∈ LV .
Theorem 6.9.
1. For every X ∈MΦ the following holds
+∞ > pi0(X) := sup
Y ∈B0∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] = sup
Y ∈LV
EP [U(X + Y )] (63)
= min
Q∈Q
min
λ≥0
λ N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]
+ EP
[
V
(
λ
dQ
dP
)] . (64)
2. If any of the three expressions is strictly smaller than V (0) = supx∈RN U(x), then the condi-
tion λ ≥ 0 in (64) can be replaced with condition λ > 0.
3. The vector Ŷ from Theorem 6.1 belongs to B0 and satisfies
N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQj
dP
∈ L1(P) ∀Q ∈ QV .
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Proof.
Item (1): take C = B0 ∩MΦ. By Theorem 6.1
sup
B0∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] < +∞ ∀X ∈M
Φ .
From (23) we deduce B0 ∩MΦ ⊆ LV ,
sup
B0∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] ≤ sup
Y ∈LV
EP [U(X + Y )]
and by Fenchel inequality (see Remark (5.8))
sup
Y ∈LV
EP [U(X + Y )] ≤ inf
λ≥0,Q∈Q
λ
 N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]+ EP [V (λdQ
dP
)] .
The chain of equalities in Equations (63)-(64) then follows by Theorem 6.3.
Item (2): Direct substitution of λ = 0 in the expression would give a contradiction, no matter
what the optimal probability measure is.
Item (3): From Theorem 6.1 we know that (57) holds. By definition of V (·), we have
U(X + Ŷ ) ≤ V (λZ) +
〈
X + Ŷ , λZ
〉
P− a.s. ∀λ ≥ 0, Z ∈ KΦ . (65)
This implies
(U(X + Ŷ ))− ≥
(
V (λZ) +
〈
X + Ŷ , λZ
〉)−
so that
(
V (λZ) +
〈
X + Ŷ , λZ
〉)−
∈ L1(P).
We prove integrability also for the positive part, assuming now Z = dQdP , Q ∈ QV and taking λ > 0
such that EP [V (λZ)] < +∞. By (58) WH →H Ŷ P−a.s. so that
EP
[(
V (λZ) +
〈
X + Ŷ , λZ
〉)+]
= EP
[
lim inf
H
(V (λZ) + 〈X +WH , λZ〉)
+
]
≤
≤ lim inf
H
EP
[
(V (λZ) + 〈X +WH , λZ〉)
+
]
≤
≤ sup
H
(EP [V (λZ) + 〈X +WH , λZ〉]) + sup
H
(
EP
[
(V (λZ) + 〈X +WH , λZ〉)
−
])
. (66)
Now since EP [〈WH , λZ〉] ≤ 0
sup
H
(EP [V (λZ) + 〈X +WH , λZ〉]) ≤ EP [V (λZ) + 〈X,λZ〉] < +∞ . (67)
Also by (65)
sup
H
(
EP
[
(V (λZ) + 〈X +WH , λZ〉)
−
])
≤ sup
H
(
EP
[
(U(X +WH))
−
])
≤
≤ sup
H
(
EP
[
(U(X +WH))
+ − U(X +WH)
])
≤
≤ sup
H
(
EP
[
(U(X +WH))
+
])
− inf
H
(EP [U(X +WH)]) . (68)
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Now use subadditivity of the function x 7→ x+ to check that
sup
H
(
EP
[
(U(X +WH))
+
])
≤ sup
H
 N∑
j=1
EP
[(
uj(X
j +W jH)
)+]+ sup
z∈RN
(Λ(z))+ ≤
≤ sup
H
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
uj
(
(Xj +W jH)
+
)]+ sup
z∈RN
(Λ(z))
where in the last step we used eq. (14). We also have, Y1 being the first element in the maximiz-
ing sequence of Theorem 6.1, infH (EP [U(X +WH)]) ≥ EP [U(X + Y1)] by construction. Thus,
continuing from (68), we get using (11)
sup
H
(
EP
[
(V (λZ) + 〈X +WH , λZ〉)
−
])
≤ sup
H
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
uj
(
(Xj +W jH)
+
)]+sup
RN
Λ−EP [U(X + Y1)] ≤
≤ sup
RN
Λ + max
j=1,...,N
(
duj
dxj
(0)
)
sup
H
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj +W jH)
+
]− EP [U(X + Y1)] < +∞ (69)
since the sequence WH is bounded in (L
1(P))N (see (58)) and EP [U(X + Y1)] > −∞.
From (66), (67), (69) we conclude that
EP
[(
V (λZ) +
〈
X + Ŷ , λZ
〉)+]
< +∞ .
To sum up, for Z ∈ QV and λ s.t. EP [V (λZ)] < +∞
〈X,λZ〉 , V (λZ),
(
V (λZ) +
〈
X + Ŷ , λZ
〉)+
,
(
V (λZ) +
〈
X + Ŷ , λZ
〉)−
∈ L1
which gives
〈
Ŷ , Z
〉
∈ L1(P), ∀Z ∈ QV .
Remark 6.10. Theorem 6.9 shows that
∑N
j=1 Ŷ
j dQ
j
dP ∈ L
1(P) ∀Q ∈ QV . However, we do not know
yet if
EP
 N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQj
dP
 ≤ 0 ∀Q ∈ QV . (70)
This will hold under some additional conditions, as shown below in Proposition 6.14.
6.3 Optimization with fixed Q ∈ QV
The following is a counterpart to Theorem 6.9 when a probability measure Q ∈ QV is fixed.
Proposition 6.11. Let X ∈MΦ and Q ∈ QV be fixed. Then
+∞ > piQ0 (X) := sup
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈MΦ,
N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Y j
]
≤ 0
 (71)
= min
λ≥0
λ N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]
+ EP
[
V
(
λ
dQ
dP
)] . (72)
Furthermore if (71) is strictly smaller than V (0) then the minimum in (72) can be taken over
(0,+∞) in place of [0,+∞).
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Proof. piQ0 (X) < +∞ follows from Remark 4.6. The equality between (71) and (72) follows from
Theorem 6.3, and the fact that C :=
{
Y ∈MΦ,
∑N
j=1 EQj
[
Y j
]
≤ 0
}
gives (C01)
+ =
{
dQ
dP
}
⊆ KΦ as
Q ∈ QV .
Corollary 6.12. Let X ∈MΦ be fixed and pi0(·), pi
Q
0 (·) be as in (63), (71) respectively. Then
pi0(X) = min
Q∈QV
(
piQ0 (X)
)
(73)
Moreover, whenever (λ̂,Q̂) is an optimum for (64), then Q̂ is an optimum for (73).
Proof. We observe that in Theorem 6.9 the minima over Q can be substituted by minima over
QV , since supY ∈B0∩MΦ EP [U(X + Y )] < +∞ by theorem 6.1. The claims then follow applying
Theorem 6.9 Item 1 together with Proposition 6.11.
Proposition 6.13. Let Q̂ ∈ QV . Then
sup
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ (L0(P))N ,
N∑
j=1
Y j
dQ̂j
dP
∈ L1(P), EP
 N∑
j=1
Y j
dQ̂j
dP
 ≤ 0
 < +∞ . (74)
Suppose the optimization problem (74) admits an optimum Ŷ . Then Q̂ ∼ P and
EP
 N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQ̂j
dP
 = 0 (75)
Proof. Define
K :=
Y ∈ (L0(P))N |
N∑
j=1
Y j
dQ̂j
dP
∈ L1(P) EP
 N∑
j=1
Y j
dQ̂j
dP
 ≤ 0
 .
By Remark 5.8, supY ∈K EP [U(X + Y )] < +∞.
We now prove that Q̂ ∼ P, using an argument inspired by [24] Remark 3.32: if this were not the
case then P(Ak) > 0, where Ak := {
dQ̂k
dP = 0}, for some component k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. Then the
vector Y˜ defined by Y˜ k := Ŷ k + 1Ak , Y˜
j := Ŷ j , j 6= k would still satisfy
N∑
j=1
Y˜ j
dQ̂j
dP
∈ L1(P), EP
 N∑
j=1
Y˜ j
dQ̂j
dP
 ≤ 0
and by monotonicity EP
[
U(X + Y˜ )
]
≥ EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
. Thus Y˜ would be another optimum,
different from Ŷ , contradicting uniqueness from Proposition 6.2 (which applies by finiteness of the
supremum in (74)).
We now show (75): if this were not the case we would have EP
[∑N
j=1 Ŷ
j dQ̂
j
dP
]
< 0 so that adding 0 <
ε sufficiently small to each component of Ŷ would give a vector still satisfying the constraints but
having a corresponding expected utility strictly grater that the supremum, which is a contradiction.
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6.4 Refined results: Existence of the optimizers
The two main Theorems in this Section show that Theorem 5.9 holds true, when A = 0, and
consequently all the results in Section 5.3 hold true as well (note that equation (101) and Section
6.6 complete the proof of Theorem 5.9).
On the one hand we will provide sufficient conditions to guarantee that not only
∑N
j=1 Y
j dQ
j
dP ∈
L1(P), but also Ŷ j dQ
j
dP ∈ L
1(P), for every j = 1, . . . , N and every Q ∈ QV or, at least, for Q = Q̂
(the optimum in the minimax expression (64)). We will rely on Theorem 6.1, ideally continuing
the proof of it. On the other hand, in setup C, we will weaken the requirements on B, especially
the one regarding closedness under truncation.
First we show that Assumption 4.2 guarantees that condition (70) holds true for the Ŷ from
Theorem 6.1.
Proposition 6.14. Under Assumption 4.2, if Y ∈ B0 then
N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP
∈ L1(P) ∀Q ∈ QV =⇒ EP
 N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP
 ≤ 0 ∀Q ∈ QV .
Proof. Observe that Ym in Definition 4.1 satisfies∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
Y jm
dQj
dP
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ max
∣∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ,
N∑
j=1
∣∣cjy∣∣
 ∈ L1(P)
and
N∑
j=1
Y jm
dQj
dP
→m
N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP
P− a.s.
hence by Dominated Convergence Theorem
0 ≥ EP
 N∑
j=1
Y jm
dQj
dP
→m EP
 N∑
j=1
Y j
dQj
dP

where the inequality for LHS comes from the fact that Ym ∈ B0∩ (L∞)N ⊆ B0 ∩MΦ and Q ∈ QV ,
so that by definition of QV ⊆ Q (see (23)) EP
[∑N
j=1 Y
j
m
dQj
dP
]
=
∑N
j=1 EQj
[
Y jm
]
≤ 0 .
We prove now that, by virtue of Proposition 6.14 and Theorem 6.9, an (extended-sense) optimum
exists in LV under Assumption 4.2 alone. The Proposition 6.15 will be applied also in setup B,
where Assumption 4.2 does not hold, and so it is formulated directly with condition (70), instead
of assuming closedness under truncation.
Proposition 6.15. Suppose that condition (70) holds true. In the notation of Theorem 6.9 we
have
sup
Y ∈LV
EP [U(X + Y )] = EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
. (76)
Moreover Ŷ ∈ B0 ∩LV , it is the unique optimum for the extended maximization problem expressed
by (76) and can be taken in such a way that
∑N
j=1 Ŷ
j = 0 P− a.s.
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Proof. Theorem 6.9 Item 3, together with (70), shows that Ŷ ∈ B0 ∩ LV ⊆ LV .
Taking C = B0 in Theorem 6.1, we have
sup
Y ∈LV
EP [U(X + Y )]
(63)
= sup
Y ∈B0∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )]
(57)
≤ EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
] Ŷ ∈LV
≤ sup
Y ∈LV
EP [U(X + Y )] .
Thus we get (76) and optimality of Ŷ . Uniqueness of optima to the problem in (76) follows from
Proposition (6.2) for K = LV .
As to the last claim, observe that the sequence (WH) in Theorem 6.1 comes from a maximizing
sequence (Ynh )h (see (58)) for EP [U(X + ·)] over B0 ∩M
Φ. We show that the sequence can be
taken in such a way that
∑N
j=1W
j
H = 0 for all H , which then implies the claim since we have (58).
It is enough to check that the maximizing sequence (Ynh) can be taken with componentwise sum
equal to 0, which can be reduced to proving
sup
Y ∈B0∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] = sup
Y ∈B∩MΦ∑N
j=1 Y
j=0
EP [U(X + Y )] .
Inequaliy (≥) follows from a trivial set inclusion, while (≤) can be seen as follows: given any
Y ∈ B0 ∩MΦ with
∑N
j=1 Y
j < 0, we can add to each component an ε > 0 in such a way that the
componentwise sum becomes equal to 0, and the corresponding expected systemic utility is strictly
increased.
6.4.1 Setup A and Setup B
Theorem 6.16.
In either Setup A or B the following hold:
1.
+∞ > sup
Y ∈B0∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] = sup
Y ∈LV
EP [U(X + Y )] (77)
= min
Q∈QV
min
λ≥0
λ N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]
+ EP
[
V
(
λ
dQ
dP
)] . (78)
Every optimum (λ̂, Q̂) of (78) satisfies λ̂ > 0 and Q̂ ∼ P. Moreover, if U is differentiable,
(78) admits a unique optimum (λ̂, Q̂), with Q̂ ∼ P.
Furthermore there exists a random vector Ŷ ∈ (L0(P))N such that:
2. Ŷ ∈ B0 ∩ LV and it is the unique optimum to the following extended maximization problem:
sup
Y ∈LV
EP [U(X + Y )] = EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
. (79)
3. Ŷ satisfies: for any optimizer (λ̂, Q̂) of (78)
Ŷ j
dQ̂j
dP
∈ L1(P) ∀ j = 1, . . . , N , (80)
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N∑
j=1
E
Q̂j
[
Ŷ j
]
= 0 =
N∑
j=1
Ŷ j . (81)
Ŷ j
dQj
dP
∈ L1(P) ∀Q ∈ QV , ∀ j = 1, . . . , N and
N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Ŷ j
]
≤ 0 ∀Q ∈ QV . (82)
Proof. We split the proof for the two sets of assumptions.
Setup A (Assumptions 4.2 and 4.3)
Item 1: Equations (77) and (78) follow from Theorem 6.9 Item 1, observing that minima over Q
can be substituted with minima over QV since the expression in LHS of (77) is finite by Theorem
6.1. Again by Theorem 6.1, we have that the hypotheses of Proposition 6.2 are met with K =
B0 ∩MΦ, hence by Theorem 6.9 Item 2 any optimum (λ̂, Q̂) of (78) satisfies λ̂ > 0. The proof of
Q̂ ∼ P is postponed after Item 2. Now we consider the uniqueness of the optimum for (78) under
the additional differentiability assumption. In the notation of Theorem 6.3 take C := B0 ∩MΦ,
and observe that (78) can be rewritten, by (61), as
min

N∑
j=1
EP
[
XjZj
]
+ EP [V (Z)] | Z 6= 0 ∈ (C
1
0)+,EP [V (Z)] < +∞

which from strict convexity of V (·) (Lemma A.5 Item 2) admits a unique optimum 0 ≤ Ẑ 6= 0.
We then get that, since λ̂ = EP
[
Ẑ
]
, dQ̂dP =
Ẑ
EP[Ẑ]
(again by (61)), uniqueness for optima in (78)
follows.
Item 2: We take the vector Ŷ from Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 6.9. By Item 3 Theorem 6.9, we
may apply Proposition 6.14 to Ŷ and deduce that E
[∑N
j=1
dQj
dP Ŷ
j
]
= 0 for all Q ∈ QV , which is
condition (70). Now Proposition 6.15 yields that Ŷ ∈ B0 ∩ LV is the unique optimum for (76),
that is for (79):
pi0(X) := sup
Y ∈B0∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] = sup
Y ∈LV
EP [U(X + Y )] = EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
(83)
We claim that when Q̂ is the optimizer of (78), then Ŷ is also an optimizer of (74) so that Q̂ ∼ P,
by Proposition 6.13. First notice that Ŷ satisfy the constraint in (74), as Ŷ ∈ LV . Moreover, as
Ŷ is an optimizer of (77),
EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
= sup
Y ∈LV
EP [U(X + Y )] (84)
≤ sup
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ (L0(P))N ,
N∑
j=1
Y j
dQ̂j
dP
∈ L1(P), EP
 N∑
j=1
Y j
dQ̂j
dP
 ≤ 0
 (85)
≤ inf
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
E
Q̂j
[
Xj
]+ EP [V (λdQ̂
dP
)] (86)
= piQ̂0 (X) = pi0(X) = EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
, (87)
where the inequalities follow from (32), (33), (35) and the equalities in (87) comes respectively
from (72), (73) and (83). We conclude that Ŷ is an optimizer of (74).
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Item 3: We claim that
Ŷ j
dQj
dP
∈ L1(P) ∀ j = 1, . . . , N, Q ∈ QV . (88)
Once this is shown, then: (80) holds true; the first equality in (81) is implied by (75) and the fact
just proved that Ŷ is the optimizer of (74); the second equality in (81) follows from Proposition
(6.15); the inequality in (82) holds true by Proposition 6.14.
We show (88): by Proposition 3.5 Item 3QV ⊆ LΦ
∗
1×· · ·×LΦ
∗
N . Recall that in the proof of Theorem
6.1 we had extracted from a maximizing sequence a sequence of Ce´saro means (WH)H converging
to a Ŷ almost surely (equation (58)), and that the sequence (WH)H satisfies: (X + WH)H is
bounded in (L1(P))N and infH EP [U(X +WH)] > −∞. We prove that this implies
γ := sup
H
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Φj((X
j +W jH)
−)
]
< +∞ . (89)
To see this, observe that
U(X +WH) =
N∑
j=1
uj(X
j +W jH) + Λ(X +WH) =
N∑
j=1
uj((X
j +W jH)
+) +
N∑
j=1
uj(−(X
j +W jH)
−) + Λ(X +WH) .
This implies
−
N∑
j=1
uj(−(X
j +W jH)
−) ≤ max
j=1,...,N
(
duj
dxj
(0)
) N∑
j=1
(Xj +W jH)
+ + sup
z∈RN
Λ(z)− U(X +WH)
where in the last line we used (11). By taking expectations on both sides we obtain (89). Indeed,
supH
∑N
j=1 EP
[
(Xj +W jH)
+
]
< +∞ by boundedness of (WH)H in (L1(P))N , and supH(−EP [U(X +WH)]) =
− infH EP [U(X +WH)] < +∞.
By Fatou Lemma
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Φj((X
j + Ŷ )−)
]
≤ sup
H
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Φj((X
j +W jH)
−)
] Eq.(89)
< +∞ .
and hence (X + Ŷ )− belongs to LΦ1 × · · · × LΦN . Take now 0 ≤ Z ∈ LΦ
∗
1 × · · · × LΦ
∗
N , Z ∈
QV . We will show that (X
j + Ŷ j)±Zj =
(
(Xj + Ŷ j)Zj
)±
∈ L1(P) for all j = 1, . . . , N , which
implies that condition (88) holds. Since again (X + Ŷ )− belongs to LΦ1 × · · · × LΦN , we have
0 ≤ (Xj + Ŷ j)−Zj ≤
∑N
j=1(X
j + Ŷ j)−Zj ∈ L1(P) for each j = 1, . . . , N . We need now to work
on the positive parts (Xj + Ŷ j)+Zj, j = 1, . . . , N .
Applying Fatou Lemma together with the trivial relation x+ = x+ x− we have
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj + Ŷ j)+Zj
]
≤ lim inf
H
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj +W jH)
+Zj
] ≤
≤ sup
H
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj +W jH)Z
j
] + sup
H
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj +W jH)
−Zj
]
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Thus, to prove (Xj + Ŷ j)+Zj ∈ L1(P), j = 1, . . . , N it is enough to show that both suprema in
the previous line are finite.
To see that
sup
H
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj +W jH)
−Zj
] < +∞ , (90)
observe that (Xj+W jH)
− ∈ LΦj , j = 1, . . . , N (Assumption 4.3), hence we have by the generalized
Ho¨lder Inequality ([19] Proposition 2.2.7)
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj +W jH)
−Zj
]
≤ 2
N∑
j=1
∥∥∥(Xj +W jH)−∥∥∥
Φj
∥∥Zj∥∥
Φ∗j
≤
≤ 2
(
sup
j=1,...,N
∥∥Zj∥∥
Φ∗j
)
sup
H
 N∑
j=1
∥∥∥(Xj +W jH)−∥∥∥
Φj
 .
Clearly, if we show that for γ defined by (89)
sup
H
 N∑
j=1
∥∥∥(Xj +W jH)−∥∥∥
Φj
 ≤ N max(1, γ) < +∞ , (91)
then (90) follows.
Splitting between the cases γ ≤ 1 and γ > 1, and using convexity of univariate utilities in the latter,
from equation (89) we infer that
∑N
j=1 EP
[
Φj
(
1
max(1,γ)(Z
j
n)
−
)]
≤ 1 . Then, just by definition of
the Orlicz norm (in the univariate case),
∥∥∥(Xj +W jH)−∥∥∥
Φj
≤ max(1, γ) , j = 1, . . . , N , which yields
(91), that is: the sequence (X +WH)
− is bounded in the norm
∑N
j=1 ‖·‖Φj on L
Φ1 × · · · × LΦN .
Going back to the optimizing sequence (WH)H in Theorem 6.1, it satisfies (WH)H ⊆ B0 ∩MΦ, so
that for every Z ∈ QV
sup
H
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj +W jH)Z
j
] ≤ N∑
j=1
EP
[
XjZj
]
< +∞ (92)
by Proposition 6.8.
To sum up, we proved that (Xj + Ŷ j)±Zj ∈ L1(P) for all j = 1, . . . , N , which implies that the
condition (88) holds.
Setup B (Assumptions 4.3 and 4.4)
Observe that Proposition 6.13 and Proposition 6.15 still apply, but Proposition 6.14 does not help
anymore, since Assumption 4.2 does not hold. We will prove that (88) holds, and also that
EP
 N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQj
dP
 = N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Ŷ j
]
≤ 0 ∀Q ∈QV (93)
As a consequence of (88) and (93), the proofs of Items 1, 2 and 3 turns then out to be identical to
the one for Setup A.
In the current setup, similarly to what was done in the previous part of the proof, we can see
that the sequence (X +WH)H of Theorem 6.1 is bounded in (L
1(P))N and (91) holds. Now we
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apply Propositions 5.17 and proposition A.10. Given the sequences (Xj +W jH)
−, j = 1, . . . , N ,
a diagonalization argument yields a common subsequence such that ((Xj +W jH)
−)H converges in
σ
(
LΦj ,MΦ
∗
j
)
on Lφj for every j. Call such limit Zj . Almost sure convergence
(Xj +W jH)
− → (X + Ŷ )− P− a.s.
implies Z = (X + Y )−. Indeed, if this were not the case assume without loss of generality
P(Zj > (Xj + Y j)−) > 0 for some j. On a measurable subset D of the event {Zj > (Xj + Y j)−},
P(D) > 0, the convergence is uniform (by Egoroff’s Theorem, Theorem 10.38 in [2]). Consequently,
by Dominated Convergence Theorem plus σ
(
LΦ(F),MΦ
∗
(F)
)
convergence and the fact that L∞ ⊆
Mφ
∗
j , j = 1, . . . , N we get EP
[
Zj1D
]
= EP
[
(Xj + Y j)−1D
]
, which is a contradiction. Since by
Proposition 5.17
QV ⊆ KΦ =M
Φ∗1 × · · · ×MΦ
∗
N
we get for any Q ∈ QV :
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj +W jH)
− dQ
j
dP
]
→H
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj + Ŷ j)−
dQj
dP
]
. (94)
By Fatou Lemma and x+ = x+ x−
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj + Ŷ j)+
dQj
dP
]
≤ lim inf
H
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj +W jH)
+ dQ
j
dP
]
≤
≤ lim inf
H
EP
 N∑
j=1
W jH
dQj
dP
+ N∑
j=1
EP
[
Xj
dQj
dP
]
+
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj +W jH)
− dQ
j
dP
] ≤
Prop.6.8
≤ lim inf
H
 N∑
j=1
W jH +
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Xj
dQj
dP
]
+
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj +W jH)
− dQ
j
dP
] =
= lim
H
 N∑
j=1
W jH
+ N∑
j=1
EP
[
Xj
dQj
dP
]
+ lim
H
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj +W jH)
− dQ
j
dP
] .
where we used Equation (94) and the fact that
∑N
j=1W
j
H is a numeric sequence converging (a.s.).
to
∑N
j=1 Ŷ
j to move from lim inf to the sum of limits. As a consequence
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj + Ŷ j)+
dQj
dP
]
≤
N∑
j=1
Ŷ j +
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Xj
dQj
dP
]
+
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj + Ŷ j)−
dQj
dP
]
(95)
We get Y ∈ L1(Q) and rearranging terms in (95)
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Xj + Ŷ j)
dQj
dP
]
≤
N∑
j=1
Ŷ j +
N∑
n=1
EP
[
Xj
dQj
dP
]
In particular, since Ŷ ∈ B0, (93) follows.
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6.4.2 Setup C
Theorem 6.17. In the Setup C we have:
1. Equations (77) and (78) hold. Moreover (78) admits a unique optimum (λ̂, Q̂), with λ̂ > 0
and Q̂ ∼ P.
Set Ŷ := −X −∇V
(
λ̂dQ̂dP
)
. Then λ̂dQ̂dP = ∇U(X + Ŷ ) and
2. Item 2 of Theorem 6.16 holds true.
3. Properties (80) and (81) hold true.
Proof. We will proceed as follows: first we will establish for any optimum (λ̂, Q̂) in Equation (78)
that λ̂ > 0 and the equivalence Q̂ ∼ P. We will then establish all the stated properties of Ŷ and
deduce a posteriori the uniqueness of the optimum in Equation (78).
STEP 1: λ̂ > 0 and Q̂ ∼ P. In the following we will denote the boundary of E ⊆ RN with ∂E.
By Proposition 6.2, we can apply Item 2 of Theorem 6.9 to guarantee that for any optimum (λ̂, Q̂),
λ̂ 6= 0.
We now partially follow the proof of [13] Proposition 3.9. Observe that
P
(
λ̂
dQ̂
dP
∈ {V = +∞}
)
= 0
otherwise we would get a contradiction with (57): supY ∈B0∩MΦ EP [U(X + Y )] < +∞. Recall from
Theorem 6.3 that in fact the minimizations in the dual problem of supY ∈B0∩MΦ EP [U(X + Y )] are
over (B0 ∩MΦ)0 and that by Remark 6.7 there exists a strictly positive vector Z :=
dQ
dP ∈ KΦ with
EP
[
V
(
dQ
dP
)]
<∞. Call Ẑ = λ̂dQ̂dP . By Assumption 4.5 then for all α ≥ 0
EP
[
V
(
Ẑ + αZ
)]
≤
1
2
EP
[
V (2Ẑ)
]
+
1
2
EP [V (2αZ)] < +∞
and clearly for all α ≥ 0 again Ẑ + αZ ∈ (B0 ∩MΦ)0. Define for α ≥ 0 να := V
(
Ẑ + αZ
)
.
Observe that να−ν0
α
is monotonically decreasing as α ↓ 0 (by convexity of V and since Z, Ẑ ≥ 0).
Applying Monotone Convergence Theorem we get for any measurable set A:
EP
[
1A
να − ν0
α
]
↓ EP
[
1A lim
α↓0
1
α
(
V
(
Ẑ + αZ
)
− V
(
Ẑ
))]
.
Choose now the set
A :=
{
λ̂
dQ̂
dP
∈
(
{V < +∞}∩ ∂((0,+∞)N )
)}
and assume by contradiction that P(A) > 0. Since
1A
να − ν0
α
= 1A
 N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(Ẑ + α˜Z)Zj
 for some 0 ≤ α˜ ≤ α
we have by Lemma A.6 that 1A
να−ν0
α
↓α −∞1A. As a consequence EP
[
1A
να−ν0
α
]
↓α −∞ which in
turns yields EP
[
να−ν0
α
]
↓ −∞ .
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At the same time we can rewrite EP [να − ν0] as
EP
[〈
X, Ẑ − (Ẑ + αZ)
〉]
+
{(
EP
[〈
X, Ẑ + αZ
〉]
+ EP
[
V (Ẑ + αZ)
])
−
(
EP
[〈
X, Ẑ
〉]
+ EP
[
V (Ẑ)
])}
≥ EP
[〈
X, Ẑ − (Ẑ + αZ
〉]
= −αEP [〈X,Z〉]
where the inequality comes from the fact that Ẑ, Ẑ + αZ ∈ (B0 ∩MΦ)0 and Ẑ minimizes
Z 7→ EP [〈X,Z〉] + EP [V (Z)] , Z ∈ (B0 ∩M
Φ)0 .
so that the term {. . . } is nonnegative. Clearly then we also get EP
[
να−ν0
α
]
≥ −EP [〈X,Z〉]
which is a contradiction. We conclude that P(A) = 0, and from the observations at the beginning
of the proof that
P
(
λ̂
dQ̂
dP
∈ ∂((0,+∞)N)
)
= 0 .
This can be restated as Q̂1, . . . , Q̂N ∼ P.
STEP 2: Ŷ ∈ LV .
By Lemma A.5 Item 2 V is differentiable through (0,+∞)N . By STEP 1 λ̂ > 0 and dQ̂dP ∈ (0,+∞)
N
a.s. so that Ŷ is well defined. Now λ̂ minimizes, for Q = Q̂, the function
(0,+∞) ∋ γ 7→ ψ(γ) :=
N∑
j=1
(
γEQj
[
Xj
])
+ EP
[
V
(
γ
dQ
dP
)]
which is real valued and convex. Also we have by Monotone Convergence Theorem and Lemma
A.7 Item 1 that the right and left derivatives, which exist by convexity, satisfy
d±ψ
dγ
(γ) =
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Xj
dQ̂j
dP
]
+
N∑
j=1
EP
[
∂V
∂xj
(
γ
dQ̂
dP
)
dQ̂j
dP
]
hence the function is differentiable. Since λ̂ is a minimum for ψ, this implies ψ′(λ̂) = 0, which can
be rephrased as
N∑
j=1
(
EP
[
Xj
dQ̂j
dP
]
+ EP
[
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂
dQ̂
dP
)
dQ̂j
dP
])
= 0 . (96)
At this point minimize over
Q 7→
N∑
j=1
(
λ̂EQj
[
Xj
])
+ EP
[
V
(
λ̂
dQ
dP
)]
where λ̂ is given above and Q varies in QV . Let again Q̂ be optimum and take another Q ∈ QV
(which implies by our standing assumption 4.5 that the expression EP
[
V
(
λdQdP
)]
is finite for all
choices of λ). Define η̂ and η to be their Radon-Nikodym derivatives with respect to P. Take a
convex combination of the two: for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 set ξx := (1 − x)η̂ + xη. By optimality of η̂ the
function
x 7→ ϕ(x) :=
N∑
j=1
(
λ̂EP
[
Xjξjx
])
+ EP
[
V
(
λ̂ξx
)]
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has a minimum at 0, thus the right derivative of ϕ at 0 must be non negative:
0 ≤
N∑
j=1
d
dx
∣∣∣
0
(
(1− x)λ̂EP
[
Xj η̂j
]
+ xλ̂EP
[
Xjηj
])
+
d
dx
∣∣∣
0
EP
[
V
(
(1− x)λ̂η̂ + xλη
)]
. (97)
Differentiation in the first summation is trivial. As to the second term observe that by convexity
and differentiability of V we have
λ̂
N∑
j=1
ηj
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
≤ λ̂
N∑
j=1
η̂j
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
+ V
(
λ̂η
)
− V
(
λ̂η̂
)
so that by Lemma A.7 Item 2, Assumption 4.5 and Q̂,Q ∈ QV we conclude N∑
j=1
ηj
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)+ ∈ L1(P) . (98)
Define H(x) := V
(
(1 − x)λ̂η̂ + xλ̂η
)
and observe that as x ↓ 0
0 ≤
(
H(1)−H(0)−
1
x
(H(x)−H(0))
)
↑
H(1)−H(0)− λ̂ N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
ηj + λ̂
N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
η̂j
 .
Thus we have by Equation (97) and Monotone Convergence Theorem
+∞ > EP [H(1)−H(0)] +
N∑
j=1
λ̂EP
[
Xj
(
ηj − η̂j
)]
≥
≥ EP
H(1)−H(0)− λ̂ N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
ηj + λ̂
N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
η̂j
 =
EP
 N∑
j=1
λ̂
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
ηj
− +H(1)−H(0)− λ̂
 N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
ηj
+ + λ̂ N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
η̂j
 .
This implies that
0 ≤
 N∑
j=1
λ̂
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
ηj
− ∈ L1(P)
since we recall that, together with (98), we have the following:
(H(1)−H(0)) ∈ L1(P) by Assumption 4.5 and Q̂,Q ∈ QV ,
N∑
j=1
λ̂
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
η̂j ∈ L1(P) by Lemma A.7 Item 1 .
We conclude that
∑N
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂dQ̂dP
)
dQj
dP ∈ L
1(P), hence also
∑N
j=1 Ŷ
j dQ
j
dP ∈ L
1(P) holds for all
Q ∈ QV .
Moreover, in view of the integrability property we just proved, Equation (97) can be rewritten as:
0 ≤
N∑
j=1
λ̂EP
[
Xj
(
ηj − η̂j
)]
+ λ̂EP
 N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
) (
ηj − η̂j
) . (99)
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Now rearrange the terms in (99) as follows
0 ≤ −λ̂
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
Xj η̂j
]
+ EP
 N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
η̂j
+ N∑
j=1
λ̂
EP [Xjηj]+ EP
 N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
)
ηj

and use (96):
0 ≤ 0− λ̂
EP
 N∑
j=1
(
−Xj −
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂η̂
))
ηj
 = −λ̂EP
 N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQj
dP
 .
This proves that Ŷ ∈ LV .
STEP 3: Integrability under optimal measure.
Ŷ j dQ̂
j
dP ∈ L
1(P)∀ j = 1 . . . , N follows from X ∈MΦ, Remark 6.5, Lemma A.7 Item 1 and the fact
that λ̂ > 0.
STEP 4 Optimality of Ŷ .
Observe that V and −U(−•) are convex functions conjugate to each other in the sense of Fenchel-
Moreau theorem, hence in the Legendre sense (see [38] Chapter V) on the interior of their respective
domains, by [38], Theorem 26.5. Also (∇(−U(−•)))−1 = ∇V ([38], Theorem 26.5 again) on
(R++)
N , which is the interieor of dom(V ) by the fact that V is finite on (R+)
N by Remark 2.6
and equal to +∞ on RN \ (R+)N by Lemma A.5 Item 1. Consequently, we get for y ∈ (R++)N
and by definition of Legendre conjugate
V (y) =
〈
(∇(−U(−•)))−1 (y), y
〉
−
(
−U
(
− (∇(−U(−•)))−1 (y)
))
= 〈∇V (y), y〉+ U(−∇V (y))
Equivalently U(−∇V (y)) = −〈∇V (y), y〉+ V (y) for all y ∈ (R++)N .
Observe now that as a consequence
U(X + Ŷ ) = U
(
−∇V
(
λ̂
dQ̂
dP
))
= −λ̂
N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂
dQ̂
dP
)
dQ̂j
dP
+ V
(
λ̂
dQ̂
dP
)
.
Taking expectations on both sides (both are integrable by previous arguments) we get
EP
[
U
(
X + Ŷ
)]
= λ̂EP
− N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(
λ̂
dQ̂
dP
)
dQ̂j
dP
+ EP [V (λ̂dQ̂
dP
)]
.
Use now the expression in (96) to substitute in the first term in RHS:
EP
[
U
(
X + Ŷ
)]
= λ̂
EP
 N∑
j=1
Xj
dQ̂j
dP
+ EP [V (λ̂dQ̂
dP
)]
.
Recognizing in RHS the optimum value in the minimax expressions of Equation (64) in Theorem
6.9, we conclude that
sup
Y ∈LV
EP [U(X + Y )] = EP
[
U(X + Ŷ )
]
= sup
Y ∈B0∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] .
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Notice that from ∇V = (∇(−U(−•)))−1 = −(∇U)−1 and X + Ŷ = −∇V
(
λ̂dQ̂dP
)
we obtain:
λ̂
dQ̂
dP
= ∇U(X + Ŷ ).
STEP 5: Ŷ ∈ B0.
The following properties hold for K := B0 ∩MΦ. K ⊆ MΦ is a convex cone such that for all
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} ei − ej ∈ K. If SeV ⊆ KΦ is defined as
SeV :=
Q | Q ∼ P, dQdP ∈ KΦ, EP
[
V
(
dQ
dP
)]
< +∞,
N∑
j=1
EQj
[
kj
]
≤ 0 ∀k ∈ K
 ⊆ KΦ
then (use Assumption 4.5) SeV = QV ∩ {[Q
1, . . . ,QN ] |Qj ∼ P ∀j = 1, . . . , N}. Also for (λ̂, Q̂) and
Ŷ as above:
1. Q̂ ∈ SeV and [
Ŷ j
dQ̂j
dP
]N
j=1
∈ (L1(P))N ,
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Ŷ j
dQ̂j
dP
]
= 0
(STEP 4 and (96))
2. for all Q ∈ SeV
N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQj
dP
∈ L1(P), EP
 N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQj
dP
 ≤ 0
(since more in general Ŷ ∈ LV by STEP 2).
As a consequence, by Theorem A.13, Ŷ is in the closure under convergence in probability P of K,
hence in B0 (which is closed in probability by Standing Assumption II).
STEP 6: uniqueness of (λ̂, Q̂).
If (λ̂, Q̂), (λ,Q) are two optima for Equation (64) with λ, λ̂ > 0, then Ŷ and Y defined corre-
spondingly as above will coincide by Proposition 6.2. At the same time ∇V is invertible (see [38]
Theorem 26.5), hence λ̂dQ̂dP = λ
dQ
dP . Taking expectations we get λ̂ = λ and
dQ̂
dP =
dQ
dP follows trivially.
STEP 7:
∑N
j=1 Ŷ
j = 0 = EP
[∑N
j=1 Ŷ
j dQ̂
j
dP
]
.
We proved in STEP 5 that Ŷ ∈ cl
Q̂
(B0 ∩MΦ). As a consequence, there exists a sequence (kn)n ⊆
B0 ∩MΦ such that kn →n Ŷ in L1(Q̂) and P-a.s. (since Q̂ ∼ P). Thus, we have
0
(96)
=
N∑
j=1
E
Q̂j
[
Ŷ j
]
= lim
n
N∑
j=1
E
Q̂j
[
kjn
] Prop. 6.8
≤ lim
n
N∑
j=1
kjn =
N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
Y ∈B0
≤ 0
where we used STEP 5 for last inequality.
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6.5 Working on (L∞(P))N
The following result is a counterpart to Theorems 6.16 and Theorem 6.17 when working in
((L∞(P))N , (L1(P))N ) in place of (MΦ,KΦ).
Theorem 6.18. The following holds:
sup
Y ∈B0∩(L∞(P))N
EP [U(X + Y )] = min
Q∈QV
min
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]+ EP [V (λdQ
dP
)] . (100)
Proof. To check (100) we can apply the same argument used in proving (63) and (64), by replacing
Theorem 6.3 with Theorem 6.4.
What is left to prove then is that for C = B0 ∩ (L∞(P))N , the set
N := (C01)
+ ∩
{
Z ∈ (L1(P)+)
N | EP [V (λZ)] < +∞ for some λ > 0
}
is in fact QV . This is a consequence of Lemma A.9.
Corollary 6.19. In either Setup A, B or C we have
sup
Y ∈B0∩(L∞(P))N
EP [U(X + Y )] = sup
Y ∈B0∩MΦ
EP [U(X + Y )] (101)
Proof. By Theorem 6.16 Item 1 (for Setups A and B), Theorem 6.17 Item 1 (for Setup C) and
Theorem 6.18, both LHS and RHS of (101) are equal to the minimax expression
min
λ≥0,Q∈QV
λ
 N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]+ EP [V (λdQ
dP
)] .
6.6 General case: total wealth A ∈ R
In this section we extend previous results to cover the case in which the total wealth A might not
be equal to 0.
For A ∈ R and Q ∈ QV we define
piA(X) := sup
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ B ∩MΦ,
N∑
j=1
Y j ≤ A

piQA(X) := sup
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈MΦ,
N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Y j
]
≤ A

It is possible to reduce the maximization problem expressed by piA(X) (and similarly pi
Q
A(X)) to
the problem related to pi0(·) (respectively, pi
Q
0 (·)).
Take any a = [a1, . . . , aN ] ∈ RN with
∑N
j=1 a
j = A. Then
piA(X) = sup
EP [U (X + Y + a− a)] | (Y − a) ∈ B ∩MΦ,
N∑
j=1
(
Y j − aj
)
≤ 0
 =
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= sup
{
EP [U (X + Z + a)] | Z ∈ B0 ∩M
Φ
}
= pi0(X + a)
where last line holds since RN + B = B under Standing Assumption II. We recognize then that
piA(X) is just pi0(·), with different initial point (X + a) in place of X .
The same technique adopted above can be exploited to show that for any a ∈ RN with
∑N
j=1 a
j = A
sup
{
EP [U(X + Y )] | Y ∈ L
(A)
V
}
= sup {EP [U(X + a+ Z)] | Z ∈ LV } .
The argument above shows how to generalize Proposition 6.11, Theorem 6.16, Theorem 6.17,
Theorem 6.18, Corollary 6.19 to cover the case A 6= 0, exploiting the same results with X + a in
place of X .
Thus the statements of Proposition 6.11, Theorem 6.16, Theorem 6.17, Theorem 6.18, Corollary
6.19 remain true replacing 0, B0, LV with A, BA, L
(A)
V respectively, and equation (72) (similarly
for (60), (64), (78), (100)) with
min
λ≥0
λ
 N∑
j=1
EQj
[
Xj
]
+A
+ EP [V (λdQ
dP
)] . (72A)
We will not go through all the proofs again, but only provide a hint about the methodology to
be followed to obtain the results. To show that −X − ∇V
(
λ̂dQ̂dP
)
is in L
(A)
V , for example, we
can use the fact that −(X + a) −∇V
(
λ̂dQ̂dP
)
is in LV by Theorem 6.17 and then move the term
A =
∑N
j=1 a
j to LHS in
EP
 N∑
j=1
(
−(X + a)−∇V
(
λ̂
dQ̂
dP
))j
dQj
dP
 = EP
 N∑
j=1
(
−X −∇V
(
λ̂
dQ̂
dP
))j
dQj
dP
− N∑
j=1
aj ≤ 0 .
A Appendix
Throughout all the Appendices, we work under Standing Assumption I and II without further
mention.
A.0.1 Superdifferentials
Proposition A.1. Let u : RN → R be concave, nondecreasing and null in 0. Let z ∈ RN . Then:
1. Any element in ∂u(z) is nonnegative.
2. For N = 1 d
±u
dx (z) ∈ ∂u(z) where
d±u
dx (z) are the left and right derivatives of u at x0.
3. For N = 1, if
lim
x→−∞
u(x)
x
= +∞ and lim
x→+∞
u(x)
x
= 0
we have
lim
z→−∞
d−u
dx
(z) = +∞ and lim
z→+∞
d+u
dx
(z) = 0
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Proof. Item 1: It follows from the fact that by definition u(x)− u(z) ≤
∑N
j=1 ν
j(xj − zj) for all
x ∈ RN for any ν ∈ ∂u(z). If for some index k νk < 0, we would get a contradiciton considering
x = z + nek ≥ z and taking the limit as n grows to +∞.
Item 2: It follows from Theorem 23.2 in [38].
Item 3: We observe that by concavity for any ε > 0
u(z)
z
≥
u(z + ε)− u(z)
ε
for z > 0 and
u(z)
z
≤
u(z)− u(z − ε)
ε
for z < 0
taking the limit as ε ↓ 0 yields
d+u
dx
(z) ≤
u(z)
z
for z > 0 and
d−u
dx
(z) ≥
u(z)
z
for z < 0
A.1 Additional properties of Multivariate Utilities
Lemma A.2. There exist a > 0, b ∈ R such that
U(x) ≤ a
N∑
j=1
xj + a
N∑
j=1
(−(xj)−) + b ∀x ∈ RN .
Proof. We start recalling that by Remark 2.3 for any concave f : RN → R and for any z ∈ RN
f(x) ≤ 〈∇f(z), (x− z)〉+ f(z) ∀x ∈ Rm .
We can thus write, for every k ∈ R
U(x) =
N∑
j=1
uj
(
(xj)+
)
+
N∑
j=1
uj
(
−(xj)−
)
+ Λ(x) ≤
≤
N∑
j=1
(
duj
dz
(0)((xj)+ − 0) + uj(0)
)
+
N∑
j=1
(
duj
dz
(k)(−(xj)− − k) + uj(k)
)
+
N∑
j=1
∂Λ
∂xj
(0)(xj−0)+Λ(0) =
= f(k) +
N∑
j=1
duj
dz
(0)(xj)+ +
N∑
j=1
duj
dz
(k)(−(xj)−) +
N∑
j=1
∂Λ
∂xj
(0)((xj)+ − (xj)−) =
= f(k) +
N∑
j=1
(
duj
dz
(0) +
∂Λ
∂xj
(0)
)
(xj)+ +
N∑
j=1
(
duj
dz
(k) +
∂Λ
∂xj
(0)
)
(−(xj)−) .
Set now
a := max
j
(
duj
dz
(0) +
∂Λ
∂xj
(0)
)
Prop.A.1.1
≥ 0
and observe that since Inada conditions hold, by Proposition A.1 Item 3 we can choose elements
in the supergradients in such a way that
min
j
(
duj
dz
(k)
)
−−−−−→
k→−∞
+∞ .
Hence for some k̂ < 0 we have
min
j
(
duj
dz
(k̂)
)
+min
j
(
∂Λ
∂xj
(0)
)
≥ 2a .
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As a consequence
U(x) ≤ f(k̂) + a
N∑
j=1
(xj)+ + 2a
N∑
j=1
(−(xj)−) = a
N∑
j=1
xj + a
N∑
j=1
(−(xj)−) + b
once we set f(k̂) = b.
Lemma A.3. For every ε > 0 there exist a constant bε such that
U(x) ≤ 2ε
N∑
j=1
(xj)+ + bε ∀x ∈ R
N . (102)
Proof. Fix ε > 0. From the fact that the Inada conditions hold, again by Proposition A.1 Item 3
we can choose elements in the supergradients in such a way that
max
j
(
duj
dx
(k)
)
−−−−−→
k→+∞
0 .
As a consequence, given ε > 0, we have for some function ψ : R→ R and some kε > 0
N∑
j=1
uj
(
xj
)
≤
N∑
j=1
uj((x
j)+) ≤ max
j
(
duj
dx
(k)
) N∑
j=1
(xj)+ψ(kε) ≤ ε
N∑
j=1
(xj)+ + ψ(kε) ∀x ∈ R
N
(103)
The concavity of Λ implies that for any fixed z ∈ RN and any x ∈ RN , by Remark 2.3,
Λ(x) ≤
N∑
j=1
∂Λ
∂xj
(z)(xj − zj) + Λ(z) ≤
≤
N∑
j=1
∂Λ
∂xj
(z)(xj)+ +
N∑
j=1
∂Λ
∂xj
(z)(−(xj)−) +
N∑
j=1
∂Λ
∂xj
(z)(−zj) + Λ(z) .
Since Λ is nondecreasing each element in its supergradient is componentwise nonnegative (Propo-
sition A.1 Item 1) and so
∑N
j=1
∂Λ
∂xj
(z)(−(xj)−) ≤ 0. Also, for any ε > 0 we can now take zε as in
Standing Assumption I and reformulate what we found as
Λ(x) ≤
N∑
j=1
∂Λ
∂xj
(zε)(x
j)+ + ξ(zε) ≤ ε
 N∑
j=1
(xj)+
+ ξ(zε) ∀x ∈ RN . (104)
We conclude from (103) and (104) that
U(x) =
N∑
j=1
uj
(
xj
)
+ Λ(x) ≤ 2ε
N∑
j=1
(xj)+ + ξ(zε) + ψ(kε) ∀x ∈ R
N .
When ε > 0 is fixed ξ(zε) + ψ(kε) =: bε is a constant and we find (102).
Lemma A.4. Let (Zn)n be a sequence of random variables taking values in R
N such that EP [U(Zn)] ≥
B for all n, for some B ∈ R.
1. If supn
∣∣∣∑Nj=1 EP [Zjn]∣∣∣ < +∞ then supn∑Nj=1 EP [∣∣Zjn∣∣] <∞.
2. If Zn → Z a.s. and supn
∑N
j=1 EP
[
(Zjn)
+
]
< +∞ then EP [U(Z)] ≥ B.
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Proof.
Item 1. Suppose that
sup
n
 N∑
j=1
EP
[∣∣Zjn∣∣]
 = sup
n
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Zjn)
+
]
+
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Zjn)
−
] = +∞ .
From the boundedness of
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Zjn
]
=
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Zjn)
+
]
−
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Zjn)
−
]
we conclude that supn
∑N
j=1 EP
[
(Zjn)
−
]
= +∞. Select a, b as in Lemma A.2 . Then we have
B ≤ EP [U(Zn)] ≤ a
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Zjn
]
− a
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Zjn)
−
]
+ b
which is clearly a contradiction.
Item 2. For ε > 0 define the function Γε as
Γε(x) := 2ε
 N∑
j=1
(xj)+
+ bε − U(x)
where the coefficient bε is the one in Lemma A.3. Then Γε ≥ 0 and by Fatou Lemma we have
2ε
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Zj)+
]+ bε − EP [U(Z)] = EP [Γε(Z)] ≤ lim inf
n
EP [Γε(Zn)] =
= lim inf
n
2ε
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Zjn)
+
]+ bε − EP [U(Zn)]
 ≤ −B + bε + 2ε lim inf
n
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Zjn)
+
] .
As a consequence
EP [U(Z)] ≥ +B + 2ε
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Zj)+
]
− sup
n
N∑
j=1
EP
[
(Zjn)
+
]
Since the term multiplying ε is finite by hypothesis and the inequality holds for all ε > 0 we
conclude that EP [U(Z)] ≥ B.
A.2 Additional properties of Conjugates of Multivariate Utilities
Lemma A.5. ,
1. The conjugate V given in Definition 2.1 is convex and componentwise convex, where by the
latter we mean that for every given k ∈ {1, . . . , N} and y ∈ RN the map over R defined by
z 7→ V ([y[−k]; z]) is convex. Moreover V = +∞ on RN \ [0,+∞)N .
2. If U is differentiable, V is strictly convex and differentiable on the interior of its domain
int(dom(V )) = (0,+∞)N . On (0,+∞)N , ∇V = −(∇U)−1 and for every sequence (yn)n ⊆
int(dom(V )) converging to some element y in the boundary of int(dom(V ))
lim
n→+∞
N∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣ ∂V∂xj (yn)
∣∣∣∣ = +∞ .
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Proof. Item 1: convexity and componentwise convexity are trivial. As to V = +∞ on RN \
[0,+∞)N , take y ∈ RN \ [0,+∞)N and let yk < 0 (this must happen for at least one component).
Then V (y) ≥ U(nek) − ny
k ↑n +∞. The fact that the interior of dom(V ) is (0,+∞)
N follows
from what we just proved and from Remark 2.6. As to Item 2, differentiability, strict convexity
and gradient property hold by [38] Theorem 26.5 applied to U , which is differentiable and stricly
convex by assumption.
Lemma A.6. If U is differentiable, the function V satisfies: for every a ∈ ∂((0,+∞)N), b ∈
(0,+∞)N
N∑
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(a+ λb) bj ↓ −∞ as λ ↓ 0 .
Proof. Follows from Lemma 26.2 in [38] setting ”x”=a, ”a”=a+b and observing that V is differen-
tiable. The fact that
∑N
j=1
∂V
∂xj
(a+ λb) bj decreases to −∞ monotonically follows from convexity
of λ 7→ V (a+ λb).
Lemma A.7. Assume that U is differentiable and that for Q≪ P, dQdP ∈ KΦ we have
EP
[
V
([
λ1
dQ1
dP
, . . . , λN
dQN
dP
])]
< +∞
for all λ1, . . . , λN > 0. Then the following hold:
1. ∂V
∂xj
([
λ1
dQ1
dP , . . . , λN
dQN
dP
])
dQj
dP ∈ L
1(P) for all λ1, . . . , λN > 0.
2. If g ∈ (L0+(P))
N is such that gj + 1
gj
∈ L∞+ (P), ∀ j = 1, . . . , N and Q ∼ P then
V
([
g1
dQ1
dP
, . . . , gN
dQN
dP
])
∈ L1(P) .
Proof. Observe first that V is differentiable by lemma A.5 Item 2.
Item 1: for every fixed y ∈ (R++)N , by componentwise convexity (see Lemma A.5 Item 1)
∂V
∂xj
(y) ≤
V ([y[−j];αyj ])− V (y)
(α− 1)yj
∀α ∈ (1,+∞) .
∂V
∂xj
(y) ≥
V ([y[−j];αyj ])− V (y)
(α− 1)yj
∀α ∈ (0, 1] .
The result then follows multiplying each term by yj and replacing y with
[
λ1
dQ1
dP , . . . , λN
dQN
dP
]
.
Item 2: to begin with, observe that for any z ∈ (0,+∞)N and 0 < ε < M the function α 7→
ϕ(α) := V ([α1z1, . . . , αNzN ]) on [ε,M ]N is convex and continuous. By Bauer Maximum Principle
(see [2] Theorem 7.69) ϕ has a maximum on an extreme point of [ε,M ]N , which is a point belonging
to the set {ε,M}N . We conclude that
sup
α∈[ε,M ]N
ϕ(α) ≤
∑
α∈{ε,M}N
ϕ(α)
Now observe that by hypothesis there exist ε,M > 0 such that for every j = 1, . . . , N ε ≤ gj ≤
M P− almost surely. Hence
V
([
g1
dQ1
dP
, . . . , gN
dQN
dP
])
≤
∑
α∈{ε,M}N
V
([
α1
dQ1
dP
, . . . , αN
dQN
dP
])
.
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The term in RHS has finite expectation by hypotheses and V is bounded from below since U(0) <
+∞, so that we conclude V
([
g1
dQ1
dP , . . . , gN
dQN
dP
])
∈ L1(P).
Lemma A.8. Let u, u˜ : R → R be convex, nondecreasing, differentiable on R and such that
u(0) = 0 = u˜(0). Assume u  u˜ (see Section 5.5.1 for the definition). Let d,D > 0 be given. Then
there exist constants K1,K2, β, B > 0, b ∈ R such that, for v the convex conjugate of u,
sup
x∈R
(u(x)− xy +Du˜(dx)) ≥

v ( y) 0 ≤ y ≤ K1
0 K1 ≤ y ≤ K2
B v (β y) + b y ≥ K2
(105)
Proof. We first observe that
sup
x∈R
(u(x)− xy +Du˜(dx)) = max
(
sup
x≤0
(u(x)− xy +Du˜(dx)) , sup
x≥0
(u(x)− xy +Du˜(dx))
)
.
(106)
We work on the supremum over (−∞, 0]: since u  u˜, we have that for constants h,H ≥ 0, b ∈ R
sup
x≤0
(u(x)− xy +Du˜(dx)) ≥ sup
x≤0
(u(x)− xy +DHu(dhx)) + b .
Setting β1 := max(dh, 1) and B1 := max(DH, 1) with simple computations u(x) +DHu(dhx) ≥
2B1u(β1x)∀x ≤ 0. Hence
sup
x≤0
(u(x)− xy +Du˜(dx)) ≥ sup
x≤0
(2B1u(β1x)− xy) + b = sup
x≤0
(
2B1u(x)− x
y
β1
)
+ b
From concavity of u it is easy to see that 2B1u(x)−x
y
β
≤ (2B1u′(0)−
y
β1
)x for every x ∈ R, where
u′(0) stands for the right derivative of u at 0 (which exists by concavity). This in turns implies
that for y ≥ 2β1B1u′(0) =: K2 we have
sup
x≤0
(
2B1u(x)− x
y
β1
)
= sup
x∈R
(
2B1u(x)− x
y
β1
)
= Bv (βy)
where we set B := 2B1 and β =
1
β1B
.
We now move to the supremum over [0,+∞): by monotonicity and u˜(0) = 0 we have
sup
x≥0
(u(x)− xy +Du˜(dx)) ≥ sup
x≥0
(u(x)− xy) .
It is then clear that, similarly to what we did before, for y ≤ u′(0) =: K1
sup
x≥0
(u(x)− xy) = sup
x∈R
(u(x)− xy) = v(y)
To sum up, from (106) we have then
sup
x∈R
(u(x)− xy +Du˜(dx)) ≥
 v ( y) 0 ≤ y ≤ K1B v (β y) + b y ≥ K2
To conclude the proof, we just observe that supx∈R (u(x)− xy +Du˜(dx)) ≥ 0 for any y ∈ [K1,K2].
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A.3 Results on Multivariate Orlicz Spaces
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We show that KΦ is a subspace of the topological dual of L
Φ and is a
subset of (L1(P))N .
For Z ∈ KΦ consider the well defined linear map φ : LΦ → L1, X 7→
∑N
j=1X
jZj. Suppose
Xn → X in LΦ and φ(Xn) → W , then we can extract a subsequence (Xnk) converging almost
surely to X , since convergence in Luxemburg norm implies convergence in probability (Lemma
3.2 Item 5). It is then clear that φ(Xnk) =
∑N
j=1X
j
nk
Zj →k
∑N
j=1X
jZj = W P−a.s., thus the
graph of φ is closed in LΦ ×L1 (endowed with product topology). By Closed Graph Theorem ([2]
theorem 5.20) the map is then continuous, thus any vector in KΦ identifies a continuous linear
functional on LΦ. Finally since [sign(Zj)]Nj=1 ∈ L
∞ ⊆ MΦ ⊆ LΦ,
∑N
j=1
∣∣Zj∣∣ ∈ L1(P) yielding
KΦ ⊆ L1(P).
Proof of Proposition 3.5 Item 1. We show that for any Z ∈ L0
(
(Ω,F ,P); [−∞,+∞]N
)
sup
X∈LΦ‖X‖Φ≤1
EP
 N∑
j=1
∣∣XjZj∣∣
 = sup
X∈MΦ‖X‖Φ≤1
EP
 N∑
j=1
∣∣XjZj∣∣
 . (107)
and that, moreover
KΦ =
Z ∈ L0 ((Ω,F ,P); [−∞,+∞]N) |
N∑
j=1
XjZj ∈ L1(P), ∀X ∈MΦ
 .
Argue as in Proposition 2.2.8 of [19]: take any X ∈ LΦ and Z ∈ (L0(P))N and assume wlog
both are componentwise nonnegative (multiplying by signum functions will not affect Luxemburg
norms by definition). Take sequences of simple functions (Y jn )n, j = 1, . . . , n each converging to
Xj monotonically from below. Clearly ‖Yn‖Φ ≤ ‖X‖Φ for each n and by Monotone Convergence
Theorem
EP
 N∑
j=1
∣∣XjZj∣∣
 = lim
n
EP
 N∑
j=1
∣∣Y jnZj∣∣
 .
This implies that
sup
X∈LΦ,‖X‖Φ≤1
EP
 N∑
j=1
∣∣XjZj∣∣
 ≤ sup
X∈L∞,‖X‖Φ≤1
EP
 N∑
j=1
∣∣XjZj∣∣
 ≤ sup
X∈MΦ,‖X‖Φ≤1
EP
 N∑
j=1
∣∣XjZj∣∣

since L∞ ⊆MΦ. The converse inequality is evident, so that (107) follows. Now suppose
Z ∈
Z ∈ L0 ((Ω,F ,P); [−∞,+∞]N) |
N∑
j=1
XjZj ∈ L1(P), ∀X ∈MΦ
 .
Observe (by using
∣∣Xj∣∣ sgn(Zj) in place of Xj in RHS below) that
sup
X∈MΦ‖X‖Φ≤1
EP
 N∑
j=1
∣∣XjZj∣∣
 = sup
X∈MΦ‖X‖Φ≤1
EP
 N∑
j=1
XjZj
 < +∞ .
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where we used a Closed Graph Theorem argument similar to the one in the proof of Proposition
3.4, with MΦ in place of LΦ, to show finiteness of RHS: since X 7→
∑N
j=1X
jZj is well defined and
continuous on MΦ it must have finite operator norm, i.e. RHS. Now it follows that
sup
X∈LΦ‖X‖Φ≤1
EP
 N∑
j=1
∣∣XjZj∣∣
 (107)= sup
X∈MΦ‖X‖Φ≤1
EP
 N∑
j=1
∣∣XjZj∣∣
 < +∞
which in turns provides Z ∈ KΦ.
Proof of Proposition 3.5 Item 2. We prove that the topological dual of (MΦ, ‖·‖Φ) is (KΦ, ‖·‖
∗
Φ).
By order continuity, for a given linear functional φ in the topological dual of MΦ we have that
A 7→ φ([0, . . . , 0, 1A, 0, . . . , 0]) defines a (finite) absolutely continuous measure with respect to P.
This gives by Radon-Nikodym Theorem a vector Z ∈ (L1)N satisfying: for every vector of simple
functions s ∈ (L∞)N φ(s) =
∑N
j=1 EP
[
sjZj
]
We now prove that Z belongs to KΦ: take X ≥ 0
and a sequence (Yn)n of non negative simple functions (vectors of simple functions more precisely)
converging to X from below.
By order continuity of the topology on MΦ we have
N∑
j=1
EP
[
sgn(Zj)Y jnZ
j
]
= φ
([
sign(Zj)Y jn
]N
j=1
)
‖·‖Φ−−−→
n
φ
([
sign(Zj)Xj
]N
j=1
)
< +∞
Thus by Monotone Convergence Theorem
+∞ > lim
n
N∑
j=1
EP
[
sgn(Zj)Y jnZ
j
]
= lim
n
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Y jn
∣∣Zj∣∣] = N∑
j=1
EP
[
Xj
∣∣Zj∣∣] .
This proves that Z ∈ Kφ, since the argument above can be applied to any 0 ≤ X ∈ MΦ and
subsequently to any X ∈ MΦ. Finally, the norm we use on KΦ is exactly the usual one for
continuous linear functionals, so (KΦ, ‖·‖
∗
Φ) is isometric to the topological dual of (M
Φ, ‖·‖Φ).
Proof of Proposition 3.5 Item 3. We show that if we suppose
LΦ = LΦ1 × · · · × LΦN , (108)
then we have that KΦ = L
Φ∗1 × · · · × LΦ
∗
N . To see this, observe that
KΦ :=
Z ∈ L0 ((Ω,F ,P); [−∞,+∞]N) |
N∑
j=1
XjZj ∈ L1(P), ∀X ∈ LΦ
 (108)=
=
Z ∈ L0 ((Ω,F ,P); [−∞,+∞]N) |
N∑
j=1
XjZj ∈ L1(P), ∀X ∈ LΦ1 × · · · × LΦN
 =
=
{
Z ∈ L0
(
(Ω,F ,P); [−∞,+∞]N
)
| XjZj ∈ L1(P), ∀Xj ∈ LΦj , ∀j = 1 . . . , N
}
.
Now apply Corollary 2.2.10 in [19] componentwise.
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Proof of Remark 3.9. To prove the claims, observe that MΦ ⊆MΦ1 × · · · ×MΦN follows from the
fact that EP
[
Φj(λ
∣∣Xj∣∣)] ≤ EP [Φ(λ |X |)], while the converse (⊇) is trivial.
We now prove inequalities (20). First observe that for X ∈ MΦ and for every j = 1, . . . , N the
functions γ 7→ EP
[
Φ( 1
γ
|X |)
]
and γ 7→ EP
[
Φj(
1
γ
∣∣Xj∣∣)] are continuous by Dominated Convergence
Theorem, hence for ‖X‖Φ 6= 0 and every j = 1, . . . , N
EP
[
Φj
(
1
‖Xj‖Φj
∣∣Xj∣∣)] ≤ EP [Φ( 1
‖X‖Φ
|X |
)]
= 1
Since also for ‖X‖Φ = 0 we have X = 0 and as a consequence
∥∥Xj∥∥
Φj
= 0, j = 1, . . . , N , we have∥∥Xj∥∥
Φj
≤ ‖X‖Φ j = 1, . . . , N . (109)
Moreover for X 6= 0 set λ := maxj
(∥∥Xj∥∥
Φj
)
. Then
EP
[
Φj
(
1
Nλ
∣∣Xj∣∣)] ≤ 1
N
EP
[
Φj
(
1
λ
∣∣Xj∣∣)] ≤ 1
N
.
Hence for X 6= 0
‖X‖Φ ≤ N max
j
(∥∥Xj∥∥
Φj
)
and the same trivially holds for X = 0. In general then
‖X‖Φ ≤ N max
j
(∥∥Xj∥∥
Φj
)
≤ N
N∑
j=1
∥∥Xj∥∥
Φj
. (110)
Now inequalities (20) follow from inequalities (109) and (110) and the claims are proved.
Lemma A.9. Let Z ∈ (L1(P))N be such that for some λ > 0 EP [V (λZ)] < +∞. Then Z ∈ KΦ.
Proof. By definition of V we have for any x, z ∈ RN −〈x, z〉 ≤ V (z) − U(X). Talke Z with
EP [V (λZ)] < +∞ for some λ > 0. For any X ∈MΦ consider X̂ defined as
X̂j := −sgn(Xj)sgn(Zj)Xj, j = 1, . . . , N
and observe that X̂ ∈ MΦ. Moreover we have λ 〈|X | , |Z|〉 = −
〈
X̂, λZ
〉
≤ V (λZ) − U(X̂). If
X̂ ∈ MΦ then, by (18), EP
[
U(X̂)
]
> −∞. Since V (λZ) ∈ L1(P) by hypothesis, we conclude that
〈X,Z〉 ∈ L1(P) for every X ∈MΦ, which in turns yields Z ∈ KΦ by Proposition 3.5 Item 1.
A.3.1 Sequential w∗ compactness in Orlicz Spaces
The following is partly inspired by [18], page 26, Chap. II, proof of Theorem 24. A similar result
is stated in [34], proof of Theorem 1, with a more technical (even though shorter) proof.
Proposition A.10. On a general probability space (Ω,F ,P), assume that Φ, Φ∗ are (univariate)
conjugate Young functions, both everywhere finite valued. Then the balls in LΦ(F), endowed with
Orlicz norm, are σ
(
LΦ(F),MΦ
∗
(F)
)
sequentially compact.
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Proof. First recall that under these assumptions L∞(F) ⊆ MΦ
∗
(F) 6= {0}, MΦ
∗
(F) is order
continuous and the norm dual of MΦ
∗
(F) is isometric to LΦ(F), endowed with the Orlicz norm
‖ · ‖LΦ(F). Consider a ball Br(F) :=
{
X ∈ LΦ(F) |‖ X ‖LΦ(F)≤ r
}
and a sequence (Xn)n ⊆
Br(F). Observe that, by Banach Alaoglu Theorem ([2] Theorem 6.21) Br(F) is w∗-compact (i.e.
σ
(
LΦ(F),MΦ
∗
(F)
)
-compact), hence Br(F) is also w∗-closed, as (LΦ(F), σ
(
LΦ(F),MΦ
∗
(F)
)
is a
Hausdorff topological space. We now prove that there exists a subsequence of (Xn)n converging in
the w∗-topology to an element X ∈ LΦ(F), which then implies the thesis, as Br(F) is w∗-closed.
Set G := σ((Xn)n) and observe that G is countably generated ([18] page 10, Chap. I, for definitions
and page 26, Chap. 2, in the proof of Theorem 24). Then a standard argument yields that MΦ(G)
andMΦ
∗
(G) are separable. Therefore, the w∗-topology σ(LΦ(G),MΦ
∗
(G)) on ballsBr(G) ⊆ LΦ(G),
is metrizable (Theorem 6.30 [2]). Applying again the Banach Alaoglu Theorem, we deduce that the
balls Br(G) are also σ(LΦ(G),MΦ
∗
(G)) compact, hence sequentially σ(LΦ(G),MΦ
∗
(G))-compact,
by metrizability of the w∗-topology on Br(G) ([2] Theorem 6.30). As Φ is convex and increasing
on R+, by Jensen inequality we obtain
EP
[
Φ
(
1
λ
|EP [X | G]|
)]
≤ EP
[
Φ
(
1
λ
|X |
)]
and it follows that
‖EP [X | G]‖Φ(G) ≤ ‖X‖Φ(F) ,
where
‖X‖Φ(·) := inf
(
λ > 0 | EP
[
Φ
(
1
λ
|X |
)]
≤ 1
)
is the Luxemburg norm in LΦ(·). Consider the conditional operator T
T :
(
LΦ(F), ‖ · ‖LΦ(F)
)
→
(
LΦ(G), ‖ · ‖LΦ(G)
)
X 7→ T (X) := EP [X | G] .
By the equivalence of the Orlicz norm with the Luxemburg norm, T is then well defined and
norm-continuous:
‖ T (X) ‖LΦ(G)≤ K ‖ X ‖LΦ(F) (111)
for some positive constant K. As Xn ∈ LΦ(F) and Xn is G-measurable, Xn ∈ LΦ(G). As Xn ∈
Br(F), then, Xn = EP [Xn | G] = T (Xn) ∈ BKr(G), by (111). By the sequential compactness of
BKr(G) proven above, we can extract a subsequence (Xnk)k that is σ(L
Φ(G),MΦ
∗
(G))-converging
to some X ∈ LΦ(G).
Now for everyW ∈MΦ
∗
(F) we have that EP [W | G] ∈MΦ
∗
(G) (because of EP [Φ∗ (λ |EP [W | G]|)] ≤
EP [Φ
∗ (λ |W |)]), and from (Xnk)k → X w.r.to σ(L
Φ(G),MΦ
∗
(G)) we obtain:
EP [XnkW ] = EP [EP [XnkW | G]] = EP [XnkEP [W | G]]→n EP [XEP [W | G]] = EP [XW ] ,
so that
(Xnk)k → X in σ(L
Φ(F),MΦ
∗
(F)).
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A.4 On Komlo´s Theorem
We now recall the original Komlo´s Theorem:
Theorem A.11 (Komlo´s). Let (fn)n ⊆ L1((Ω,F ,P, );R) be a sequence with bounded L1 norms.
Then there exists a subsequence (fnk)k and a g again in L
1 such that for any further subsequence
the Ce´saro means satisfy:
1
N
∑
i≤N
fnki → g P− a.s. as N → +∞
Proof. See [30] Theorem 1a.
Corollary A.12. Let a sequence (Yn)n be given in L
1(P1)×· · ·×L1(PN ) such that for probabilities
P1, . . . ,PN ≪ P
sup
n
N∑
j=1
EP
[∣∣Y jn ∣∣ dPjdP
]
<∞ .
Then there exists a subsequence (Ynh)h and an Ŷ ∈ L
1(P1)× · · · ×L
1(PN ) such that every further
subsequence (Ynhk )k satisfies
1
K
K∑
k=1
Y jnhk
→ Ŷ j Pj − a.s. ∀ j = 1, . . .N as K → +∞ .
Proof. We suppose N = 2, the argument can be iterated. The result follows from a diagonal
argument: take the first component, we have a subsequence and an Ŷ 1 s.t. each further subsequence
has P1−a.s. converging Ce´saro means as in Theorem A.11. Now take this sequence in place of the
one we began with, and do the same for the second component. Notice that in the end we get a
subsequence for the second component too, and the corresponding indices yield a subsequence of
the one we extracted for the first component. The claim follows.
A.5 Integrability Issues
The following is a variant of Theorem A.4 in [5].
Theorem A.13. Under Standing Assumption I and Assumption 4.5, let K ⊆ MΦ be a convex
cone such that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} ei − ej ∈ K and set
SeV :=
Q | Q ∼ P, dQdP ∈ KΦ, EP
[
V
(
dQ
dP
)]
< +∞,
N∑
j=1
EQj
[
kj
]
≤ 0 ∀k ∈ K
 ⊆ KΦ .
Suppose Ŷ ∈ (L0(P))N satisfies:
1. for some Q̂ ∈ SeV [
Ŷ j
dQ̂j
dP
]N
j=1
∈ (L1(P))N ,
N∑
j=1
EP
[
Ŷ j
dQ̂j
dP
]
= 0 .
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2. for all Q ∈ SeV
N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQj
dP
∈ L1(P), EP
 N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQj
dP
 ≤ 0 .
Then Ŷ is in the L1(Q̂1)× · · · × L1(Q̂N )-norm closure of K. In particular, Ŷ is in the closure of
K under convergence in probability P .
Proof. We first prove by contradiction that Ŷ belongs to the L1(Q̂)-norm closure of K−L∞+ (Q̂) =
K− (L∞(P))N (equality holds by equivalence of the probabilities). Suppose this were not the case.
Then Ŷ /∈ cl
Q̂
(
K − (L∞+ (P))
N
)
, which is norm closed and convex (being closure of a convex sets).
By convexity, cl
Q̂
(
K − (L∞+ (P))
N
)
is also closed in the topology induced on L1(Q̂1)×· · ·×L1(Q̂N)
by the pairing (
L1(Q̂1)× · · · × L1(Q̂N ), L∞(Q̂1)× · · · × L∞(Q̂N )
)
As a consequence, we can apply Hahn-Banach Separation Theorem to get a class ξ ∈ L∞(Q̂) =
(L∞(P))N with
0 = sup
k∈K−(L∞+ (P))
N
EP
 N∑
j=1
ξjkj
dQ̂j
dP
 < EP
 N∑
j=1
ξj Ŷ j
dQ̂j
dP
 . (112)
We now work componentwise. First observe that
[−1ξj<0]
N
j=1 ∈ 0− (L
∞
+ (P))
N ⊆ K − (L∞+ (P))
N
so that ξj ≥ 0 Q̂j (hence P)-a.s. for every j = 1, . . . , N . Hence ξj dQ̂
j
dP ≥ 0 P-a.s. for every
j = 1, . . . , N .
Moreover since ei − ej ∈ K for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} we have
EP
[
ξ1
dQ̂1
dP
]
= · · · = EP
[
ξN
dQ̂N
dP
]
. (113)
It follows that for every j = 1, . . . , N
P
(
ξj
dQ̂j
dP
> 0
)
> 0
since, if this were not the case, one of the values in the chain in Equation (113) would be 0, hence
all of them would be 0. Non negativity would then imply that ξ1 dQ̂
1
dP = . . . ,= ξ
1 dQ̂
N
dP = 0, which
yields a contradiction with strict inequality in Equation (112). We conclude that the vector
dQj1
dP
:=
1
EP
[
ξj dQ̂
j
dP
]ξj dQ̂j
dP
is well defined and identifies a vector of probability measures Q1 = [Q
1
1, . . . ,Q
N
1 ]≪ P.
Observe that ξ ∈ (L∞(P))N and dQ̂dP ∈ KΦ implies
dQ1
dP
∈ KΦ .
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Equations (112) and (113) yield
sup
k∈K
 N∑
j=1
EP
[
kj
dQj1
dP
] ≤ 0 < EP
 N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQj1
dP
 . (114)
We observe that if we could prove Q1 ∈ SeV , we would get a contradiction with Item 2 in the
hypothesis. However this needs not to be true, and some more work is necessary, as shown in the
subsequent arguments.
Let us now fix k ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and observe that since Q̂ ∈ SeV we have Q̂ ∼ P, and for Q1 above
we have Qk1 ≪ Q̂
k,
dQk1
dQ̂k
= ξ̂k ∈ L∞(Q) = L∞(P). Take λ ∈ [0, 1) and define Qλ ∼ P via
dQkλ
dP
:= (1− λ)
dQ̂k
dP
+ λ
dQk1
dP
.
It is easy to check that
0 < 1− λ ≤
dQkλ
dQ̂k
≤ λ
dQk1
dQ̂k
+ (1− λ) .
Apply Lemma A.7 Item 2 with gk =
dQkλ
dQ̂k
and gk dQ̂
k
dP =
dQkλ
dP , k = 1, . . . , N , to deduce from
EP
[
V
(
dQ̂
dP
)]
< +∞ that
EP
[
V
(
dQλ
dP
)]
< +∞, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1) .
Moreover by Q̂ ∈ SeV and Equation (114)
N∑
j=1
EP
[
kj
dQjλ
dP
]
≤ 0 ∀k ∈ K, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1)
which yields Qλ ∈ SeV , ∀λ ∈ [0, 1). At the same time
EP
 N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQjλ
dP
 = (1−λ)EP
 N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQ̂j
dP
+λEP
 N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQj1
dP
 −−−→
λ→1
EP
 N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQj1
dP
 Eq.(112)> 0 .
which is a contradiction (with Item 2 in the hypotheses).
Now we prove that in fact Ŷ ∈ cl
Q̂
(K): observe that there exists sequences (kn)n ⊆ K and
(fn)n ∈ (L∞+ (P))
N such that (kn − fn)→ Ŷ in L1(Q̂)-norm and P-almost surely. Now we have
EP
 N∑
j=1
kjn
dQ̂j
dP
− EP
 N∑
j=1
f jn
dQ̂j
dP
 = EP
 N∑
j=1
(
kjn − f
j
n
) dQ̂j
dP
→n EP
 N∑
j=1
Ŷ j
dQ̂j
dP
 = 0 (115)
by Item 1 in the hypothesis. As Q̂ ∈ SeV the first sum in LHS of (115) is non positive, while the
second summation is non negative (fn ∈ (L∞+ (P))
N ). We then get that both these summations
tend to zero. In particular
EP
 N∑
j=1
f jn
dQ̂j
dP
 = EP
 N∑
j=1
∣∣f jn∣∣ dQ̂jdP
→ 0 as n→ +∞.
Thus fn →n 0 in L1(Q̂)-norm, which gives us that Ŷ is the L1(Q̂)-norm limit of a sequence in K.
Finally, Ŷ is in the closure under convergence in probability P of K: just extract a subsequence
(knh )h with k
j
nh
→ Ŷ j Q̂j − a.s. for every j = 1, . . . , N and notice that Q̂j ∼ P for each j =
1, . . . , N .
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